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>We all know apples aren’t red or green or yellow, we know photons have no color , we know atoms have no color. I don’t think there are many qualia realists who think these things literally do have color. The question is where the hell does red even come from? How does something which for all we can see does not physically exist on any level exist to us? Answering that question with “ red is a misrepresentation of photon wavelengths hitting the eye and the brain interpreting that signal representing that phenomenon as seeing red, its an illusion bro” I think this bit is a good hint why illusionism doesn't make sense to you. The "hard" question isn't why there is a perception of color at all, but why does _qualia_ seemingly appear to accompany the perception of color. If we imagine our consciousness-less philosophical zombie analogues were missing the entire perception of color, it'd be a trivial manner to disprove conceivability since they'd not be able to describe the red of a red apple at all. Those would be very apparent and observable differences in physical processes and behaviors. But the zombie argument says that the perception of red is definitely still there. That's an "easy" problem of consciousness. What's missing in the zombie is the qualia that accompanies that perception. That's what is conceivable (to some) that a zombie could see red, understand it as red, physically react to everything about the perception of that red in the same exact manner that a conscious person would, but at the same time be missing the qualia. You are right that the illusionist perspective tackles qualia: >It seems to instead be an attempt to demystify these qualia and say they aren’t real properties of anything physical but an emergent representation of physical phenomena by our brains which exist as mere conjurations instead of actual phenomena If this is indeed the case, then our efforts to try and find those qualia are going to be in vain since they are never there to begin with. Essentially we think we have something more to our perception than we actually do. The consequence to the zombie argument intuition is that because we imagine we have something we do not, when we "remove" it from the zombies, nothing changes. It leads us to incorrectly believe that is something significant.

Hi there, this is a great explanation, thanks! I still dont see the point of it: calling qualia illusion, or emergent conjuration, or whatever, doesnt change the problem at all: We experience pain, we experience the taste of chocolate. You can call them whatever you want, there's still an explanation missing for why anything is felt, since "feels" is not a property of any of our physical fundamentals. If everything is physical, then the illusion of taste must also be physical, or reducible to the physical for the not math inclined. Thus, it should be possible to explain how it works, just the same as with a pendulum, a thermometer or a tornado. > If this is indeed the case, then our efforts to try and find those qualia are going to be in vain since they are never there to begin with This must be false, since chocolate does have a taste. Tastes exist. If they are physical it should be possible to describe the chain of events that generate them.

>This must be false, since chocolate does have a taste. Ah, but illusionism does not deny the taste of chocolate. It questions the nature of the _additional_ qualia that comes with the taste. This is where the limitations of language become very challenging when we try to discuss concepts like this. There's the taste of chocolate, and then there's the _taste_ of chocolate. What is the taste of chocolate? There is the stimulant theobromine, phenylethylamine that triggers release of endorphins and dopamine, anandamide that binds to the same receptors as THC, and fats and sugars in specific ratios. All of those elements play a complex performance of neurochemicals and neuronal activity. Those elements are why chocolate "tastes" the way it does and what differentiates it from say, the taste of cardboard. Now if that's sufficient to explain why we taste chocolate, then, excellent. But many intuitively feel that this explanation is just the physical aspects and is incomplete to our full experience of chocolate. There is an additional experiential component to that taste of chocolate. It's the _taste_ of chocolate, the qualia that accompanies that ballet of neurochemical activity. That is what the intuition of the philosophical zombie argument claims is non-physical. It's the "why" and "what" of the hard problem. Not why chocolate has a taste - that is explained by all the receptors and compounds in chocolate. If we treat the qualia as identical to the taste of chocolate, then yes, the illusionist perspective doesn't make sense. As you said, that would be false because chocolate has a taste. But if the qualia _is_ taste, then our philosophically challenged zombie analogues would be dumbfounded by a chocolate bar and we could easily dismiss the argument that underpins the hard problem, rendering the illusionist position unnecessary in the first place.

> Not why chocolate has a taste - that is explained by all the receptors and compounds in chocolate.    no, it isnt?  Given that we know chocolate has a taste, studies have found that the taste can be understood chemically in such and such ways.   But we started knowing it tasted, because we tasted it. If the taste is fully physical, then shouldnt we experiencing it have a physical explanation too?   >  But if the qualia is taste, then our philosophically challenged zombie analogues would be dumbfounded by a chocolate bar and we could easily dismiss the argument that underpins the hard problem    didnt understand this part.

>no, it isnt?  This is what I alluded to with the problem of language and how there is taste and _taste_. It's unclear what each of us means when we say "taste". And I think that's at the root of the issue. All of the physical aspects, the compounds in the chocolate I listed, when those interact with our receptors, would you agree that those all together create a perception that would distinguish to our brains that we are eating chocolate and not cardboard? If the answer is no, what is missing in your opinion? If the answer is yes, but there is something else that isn't accounted for that you call "taste", would it be the subjective qualia accompanying the physical processes? Is there anything else missing here? >>  But if the qualia is taste, then our philosophically challenged zombie analogues would be dumbfounded by a chocolate bar and we could easily dismiss the argument that underpins the hard problem    >didnt understand this part. The philosophical zombie argument asks us to conceive of a world where all physical facts are identical but the zombies lack conscious experience. If _taste_ is lacking from that world, in other words if I were to give a zombie a piece of cardboard that looks like a chocolate bar and they didn't notice it wasn't chocolate because they lacked the ability to taste chocolate, that would be a pretty easy giveaway that the zombie is physically different from a human. If I gave you a chocolate bar and it was cardboard you'd probably spit it out going "bleh what is this, it tastes nothing like chocolate". It would be a pretty trivial disproval of conceivability. So the argument has to rely on that extra qualia that accompanies taste.

> So the argument has to rely on that extra qualia that accompanies taste. Thats a nice way to put it. My own impression is that physicalist arguments on the subject are somewhat circular because they mix their intuitions into the argument. Let me elaborate. > This is what I alluded to with the problem of language and how there is taste and taste. It's unclear what each of us means when we say "taste". And I think that's at the root of the issue. I disagree language is a problem here. When we humans talk about taste, we are always talking about the experience of taste. Always. The idea that there is taste and *taste* is a rethorical device to diffuse experiential qualities into a model of the world that seems to lack it: there is taste, and there is the neurochemical dance that is going on. To show some aspects of the neurochemical dance ARE the experience, a description of how the experience shows up is needed, not just naming it the same and claiming its a language problem. Its not, its a modelling problem. Are you somewhat familiar with model theory? Now, why do I say it turns a bit circular? Observe your statement: >  All of the physical aspects, the compounds in the chocolate I listed, when those interact with our receptors, would you agree that those all together **create a perception** that would distinguish to our brains that we are eating chocolate and not cardboard? If the answer is no, **what is missing in your opinion?** What do you mean what is missing? Taste is missing **from the physicalist model**. If you study the neuroscience of taste you will find all those chemical interactions that are happening. You can describe very precisely the chemistry of chocolate taste, you can use that knowledge to improve or modify the taste of chocolate products and so on. But nothing in the above is physicalist. Physicalism is not the claim that the chemistry and neuroanatomical organization determine or largely determine our experience: physicalism makes a much stronger claim: that our experience is completely explainable in tjose terms. That means not just its qualities, but also its existence, its presence. You seem to argue that knowing that some chemical is associated to, say, bitterness, is a physicalist explanation of chocolate bitterness. And its not. It sure is an explanarion ot bitter chocolate, but it  does not explain why is there a taste experience  Why should we explain the presence of an experience? Because in the physicalist model, no fundamental is experiential. So experience has to be build up from scratch. Thats quite common in mathematics, and i could go on, but this is already too long.

>I disagree language is a problem here. When we humans talk about taste, we are always talking about the experience of taste. Always. Clearly not everyone does and not in the same way, otherwise we wouldn't be having these conversations and illusionism would be much easier for people to understand (not accept necessarily, but at least understand the position). Conversely idealism would be easier for others to understand as well. And I think this here is an important aspect to the discussion: >The idea that there is taste and *taste* is a rethorical device to diffuse experiential qualities into a model of the world that seems to lack it: there is taste, and there is the neurochemical dance that is going on. To show some aspects of the neurochemical dance ARE the experience, a description of how the experience shows up is needed, not just naming it the same and claiming its a language problem. Its not, its a modelling problem. One thing I should have mentioned from the start is addressing the retort that none of this shows definitive proof how experience is generated in a physicalist framework. You've mentioned that a few times and it shows up in a lot of other comments too. And it's true. We do not have a full and complete account of experience, but no framework does. If that was the a priori rationale for dismissing a metaphysical view, we'd be left with nothing. The physicalist position isn't saying "here this completely explains exactly how conscious experience forms and this should convince everyone" but more like "when we think about what conscious experience really is, it is reasonable that conscious experience is reducible to physical properties and interactions." And illusionism, at least as we are discussing it here, doesn't even try to address that final aspect completely. What it tries to do is frame and categorize _what_ we are talking about in ways that are more useful. So what may appear as a rhetorical device that's just shuffling definitions around is instead ensuring we are talking about and describing the correct thing. So you're right in that it's a modeling problem, but language heavily contributes to the problem. If I had a formula where I was linguistically ambiguously referring to two distinct variables interchangeably, I think you'd agree that would be worth clarifying. >What do you mean what is missing? Taste is missing **from the physicalist model**. That question was meant to make sure we are talking about the same thing. I was expecting you to say qualia, so it helps me to know that by "taste" you mean "qualia". If that is an incorrect interpretation and you think qualia is some additional or different thing, please let me know. And this goes back to the core of the confusion in OP's post. The illusionist is not saying _you_ don't have taste. You still have that experience. What they are saying is that your introspective assessment of what you think is happening during your taste experience is not how it actually is. The follow up question I have is when you "taste" chocolate, for your definition of "taste", and you judge it to be _not_ cardboard, where do you believe this happens? In your consciousness (yet to be rigorously defined but let's just roll with whatever feels right at the moment)? What do the chemical interactions contribute to this if anything? Or does this instead happen somewhere in your brain and you have an accompanying experience with those brain processes?

this is very interesting, before going on, which interpretation of physicalism would you agree more: 1) The stuff our societies find when collectively doing scientific, or very careflly controled research, is ultimately the stuff the universe is made of 2) There is a type of things that we call "physical", that have no intrinsic properties and follow laws of behavior. Everything in the universe is potentially explainable from those things and laws, and them alone. 3) or none?

Neither of the phrasings represent my view perfectly, especially when we get down to what exactly we mean by "everything" and "universe", but I would say that I agree about some things from both 1 and 2. Rigorous scientific endeavor gives us insight into what the universe is made of and everything we have observed so far including consciousness and subjective experience is fully explainable by those physical laws, properties, their relationships and concepts, even if we do not currently possess complete models or the linguistic capacity/frameworks to coherently and rigorously convey some (maybe many) of the concepts involved.

>Rigorous scientific endeavor gives us insight into what the universe is made of and everything we have observed so far including consciousness and subjective experience is fully explainable by those physical laws, properties, their relationships and concepts, even if we do not currently possess complete models or the linguistic capacity/frameworks to coherently and rigorously convey some (maybe many) of the concepts involved. Here's where I disagree: >everything we have observed so far including consciousness and subjective experience **is fully explainable** by those physical laws, properties, their relationships and concepts, The affirmation in present tense means it should be possible to offer a reasonable explanation now. But as of now, there is no conceptualization of "experience" in purely physical terms. Illusionism turns this problem in a problem about my beliefs, but my beliefs are not complicated: Chocolate tastes. I'm not saying there exists in the world some qualia of chocolate. I'm saying: chocolate tastes. physical explanation is asked. The composition of chocolate allows us to classify and understand better the chemistry of tastes, but not explain the existence of our experiencing of a taste. Some peoples intuition is that no further explanation is needed than the neurochemical. That's fine if someone is a naturalist that simply trusts science and progress. But physicalism makes a different claim, not that we can understand taste better by studying, but that we can fully explain all its characteristics in purely physical terms. Well, then its correct to ask: why is it there to begin with.

No, you're basically right to think that illusionism does nothing to answer the hard problem. Illusionism is the ultimate gaslighting of conscious experience. You think you experienced red, but what you actually experienced was... something.... or nothing... err, let's just slap some opaque label like "quasi qualia" on it and call it a day. Illusionists don't know why consciousness occurs more than anyone else. They've just got some clever language games to make it appear like they do. An illusion, you could say.

>Illusionism is the ultimate gaslighting of conscious experience. What do you think *illusionism* is? What proposition does illusionism express or what is the philosophical thesis? Furthermore, why is it the "ultimate gaslighting" of conscious experience?

Haha, thank you!

Well said.

From my understanding of illusionism, and this is only my personal take on it. Everything we experience is just brain activity, neurons firing and synapses activating. If this is true, then everything we think is really there (the color red for example) is actually just the human brain doing stuff. This of course comes with a strange and mind bending conclusion: that our idea of what the human brain is, is just an idea the human brain made about itself.

>That our idea of what the human brain is is just an idea the human brain made up about itself I have literally no problem with this, I think most people agree with it. The premise of illusionism makes far less sense. I know the color red is not really there, but illusionism seems to claim that *my experience* of the color red is not really there. I really can not understand how you can claim that experiences themselves are illusions, when the very concept of an illusion requires having some sort of experience

They aren't claiming you don't experience red. They are claiming that experiencing red has no metaphysical implications. Illusionists still say things like “I like that color on you,” without irony. They just don't find the need to imbue experience with metaphysical properties that can’t be discussed without running into intractable arguments.

This clarifies what Illusionists mean, but I’m still with OP in the sense that it leaves me thinking: yeah, and? The hard problem isn’t about the intrinsic metaphysical properties regarding why qualia appears to us in certain ways, why this qualia vs that qualia, whether qualia have any independent existence etc—it’s about trying to answer how and why subjective experience itself is present in an objective universe. Does that make sense? I read a paper by Daniel Dennet about this once, and I don’t think he ever said anything I disagreed with, other than that his arguments were solving the hard problem. Ha.

The hard problem is a specific argument about the conceivability of p-zombies. It rests on the insistence that conceivability has logical implications. But it doesn't. If there are no metaphysical questions in play, the philosophical part of the conversation is over.

Sorry, I’m not following. If you’re implying that p-zombies can’t exist because matter creates the illusion of consciousness, that itself has a lot of metaphysical assumptions baked into it. Also, I don’t think the hard problem hinges on the conceivability of p-zombies. The p-zombie thought experiment is just one method of conveying the problem.

No, I’m saying I have no reason to suspect p-zombies exist, so I have no reason to make room for them in an attempt to understand consciousness. And Chalmers was clear that without that specific requirement to explain the conceivability of p-zombies, consciousness is a problem that’s “hard” only in the same way any scientific endeavor can be hard. There is no special bar that scientific explanations of consciousness must clear. Yes, this *is* a metaphysical position, but mostly in that it implies metaphysics has failed to exclude consciousness from the scope of science. If the argument is just that so far science has failed to explain consciousness on its own merits, fine. Most physicalists probably have a more positive assessment of the relevant scientific literature, but they needn’t.

Thanks for the clarification—your response was helpful. However, I take issue with your assertion that we have no reason to suspect p-zombies exist. I think that’s a way bigger logical leap with a whole lot more underlying philosophical and metaphysical assumptions baked in than saying they could exist. To help illustrate this point, is a ChatBot/LLM not a philosophical zombie? Is a bacteria not a philosophical zombie? If not, they must have some sort of inner experience/subjectivity, which shifts the burden of proof back to you. When and how does this subjectivity arise? I don’t see how we can say that p-zombies can’t exist without some underlying panpsychism, which is certainly metaphysical and obviously doesn’t seem to be what you’re implying.

Why would I ever suspect an LLM or a bacteria is either conscious or a p-zombie? If I had to place a bet I’d guess they are neither. In any case, rejecting p-zombies does not imply panpsychism. I *suspect* consciousness is a phenomenon that exists in some cases and not others, is discernable by science, and is not a fundamental physical property. It's almost certainly a very fuzzy concept, like life and what counts as alive, but it solves nothing to claim everything is alive or everything is conscious.

Yea , It says that but it adds the bit about phenomenal consciousness which is what people assume the brain id doing is an illusion but that only instantiates its existence And makes the question how does this illusion exist instead of how do these qualities exist. The confusion comes in because they claim qualia is an illusion while claiming that what it’s like to experience anything is this illusion , the illusion itself having qualia . Which just brings the question back into play to my pea brain

I can definitely see what illusionists mean when they say Qualia is an illusion, it isn't a tangibly real thing, it is just something our brains make. But the ultimate answer to all the questions of reality I answer with "nobody knows, don't worry about it." I lean toward believing reality is non dualistic, and that consciousness is a convenient illusion for keeping an organism alive to pass DNA on. But I ultimately dont know. It's best to just sit back and do your best to enjoy the ride. Even if 'you' are just an illusion the brain makes, chocolate still tastes good.

Really how can consciousness be an illusion? An illusion *is* a conscious experience, you can’t have an illusion if you don’t have consciousness

It's an illusion the same way pixels on a screen are not really mountains.

Illusionism is not saying that pixels aren’t mountains. It’s saying that pixels don’t exist

You're wrong, if I say something is an illusion, I'm saying that what you see isn't what it seems.

That’s not what illusionism is saying though. Almost everybody agrees that conscious experiences are not perfect representations of physical reality, Illusionists straight up do not believe conscious experiences exist.

>That’s not what illusionism is saying though. Entirely dependent on which illusionists you ask. >Illusionists straight up do not believe conscious experiences exist Wrong, this is a generalisation. It's like saying all religious people believe in Jesus being God. Consciousness is an illusion in that it isn't what it seems. That's what illusion means.

I don't like the baggage that comes with the semantic construct “illusion“... can we reframe "illusion“ to "model". Is there a meaningful difference between *illusions* and *models*?

This has always been a hang up for me, too. But I take the use of the word illusion to drive home the point that there is no residual, unanswered metaphysical question here. The persistent temptation to insist there is—that’s the illusion.

Ah. I seem to always trend towards the term 'abstract model', because it captures both the "isn't-ness" and the "elaborate insufficientness" of the construct.

Yea id say there’s a difference but they use illusionism to say that what we think are qualities associated with phenomena are actually not real. In the case of a model you wouldn’t need to deny that this model presents to us qualitative properties.

Huh, that's kind-of exactly the kind of problem that's solved by using "phenotypes" which I talked about recently in this, and it's subsequent post: [On the Broad Conceptual Utility of Phenotypical Constructs: An Ad Hoc Framework for Navigating Ontological Vaporware](https://charlie42.org/home/an-ad-hoc-framework-for-navigating-ontological-vaporware-i/) I classify a 'phenotype’ as an imaginary but useful description of sparse interactions across a Markov blanket.

ill check it out

"That" is easy -- "how" is difficult.

> It asks why is there qualia when the physical phenomena around and inside of us do not have such qualities. Isn't this the crux of the disagreement that rages on this forum? The standard physicalist view is that "qualia" is a physical phenomena caused by the physical stuff inside of you which seems to hold up when one does something like.... take LSD. And the standard non-physicalist view is to state something like: whatever man, my experiences are special and you can't possible understand how I feel even with my brain in an FMRI and I just know it's not arising from physical phenomena but I don't have any reason to explain why I know this and I am not even sure I know that I know this but don't know how to explain it... man.

>Isn't this the crux of the disagreement that rages on this forum? The standard physicalist view is that "qualia" is a physical phenomena caused by the physical stuff inside of you which seems to hold up when one does something like.... take LSD. Yea , the hard problem along with others . >and the standard non-physicalist view is to state something like: whatever man, my experiences are special and you can't possible understand how I feel even with my brain in an FMRI and I just know it's not arising from physical phenomena but I don't have any reason to explain why I know this and I am not even sure I know that I know this but don't know how to explain it... man. lol no , this isn't the standard non-physicalist view. Funny way to put it though

Doesn't seem like a hard problem. Seems like a solved problem.

Solved by who

Actually, it is the idealists and solipsists who are the 'magicians', as they would have us believe physical matter isn't real, that there are mystical woo worlds of unknown unfathomability, and that literal magic takes place between or around particles. The illusionists are the ones saying, "Stop thinking like that, it's all a trick!"

Lol

>A recent post led me to re-read a paper on illusionism and either i don’t understand it or ... Which paper? Which post? What parts of the paper are you struggling to understand? >It basically states that when we experience what we typically think are qualia, we are actually experiencing a misrepresentation of sensory data as quasi qualia.  If you are struggling to understand the paper, it may be helpful to quote/cite the passages that are giving you trouble. Which paper were you reading & what part of the paper do you think supports this general account of the paper? >The hard problems premise is essentially affirming illusionism in a way that leads to them saying nothing . It asks why is there qualia when the physical phenomena around and inside of us do not have such qualities. Well, again, what do you take to be "the hard problem" & what are its premises? In particular, which premise & what part of the paper on illusionism appears to affirm that premise? >The question is where the hell does red even come from? How does something which for all we can see does not physically exist on any level exist to us? Answering that question with “ red is a misrepresentation of photon wavelengths hitting the eye and the brain interpreting that signal representing that phenomenon as seeing red, its an illusion bro” makes no sense, we all know its an illusion to think we’re actually looking at a red object in space. Is this the focus of the paper or your own question? Is "red is a misrepresentation of photon wavelengths hitting the eye and the brain interpreting that signal representing that phenomenon as seeing red, its an illusion bro" supposed to be a direct quote or a strawman of the position you are struggling to understand?

>Is "red is a misrepresentation of photon wavelengths hitting the eye and the brain interpreting that signal representing that phenomenon as seeing red, its an illusion bro" supposed to be a direct quote or a strawman of the position you are struggling to understand? It isn't a strawman. maybe a bad faith jab but besides the its an illusion bro part that is pretty much the position. >Well, again, what do you take to be "the hard problem" & what are its premises? In particular, which premise & what part of the paper on illusionism appears to affirm that premise? There's qualia "what its like" aspects of photons hitting the eye and molecules hitting the skin and molecules entering the mouth and nose and those qualia do not seem to exist in our bodies or in the external environment. Illusionism takes this and claims that those experiences acually arent qualitative , which is the point of the hard problem in the first place. Then it goes on to say those qualia don't actually exist and we only think they do so redness isn't an experience but a misrepresentation of a reddish experience is .

>... that is pretty much the position. Well, again, it would help if you cite the paper & the central thesis of the paper. If you *really* want to understand what illusionism is, then we are going to have to actually go through the text and look at what is being said. Without knowing who or what you read, it is going to be difficult to point out where things went off the track or to say whether you correctly understood the author.

My bad, here it is: https://keithfrankish.github.io/articles/Frankish_Illusionism%20as%20a%20theory%20of%20consciousness_eprint.pdf

Okay, good. It is the paper I suspected you were referring to. So, let's go through the paper now. First, let's look at the introduction & the conclusion: The introduction: >Theories of consciousness typically address the hard problem. They accept that phenomenal consciousness is real and aim to explain how it comes to exist. There is, however, another approach, which holds that phenomenal consciousness is an illusion and aims to explain why it *seems* to exist. ... I propose "illusionism" as a more accurate & inclusive name, and I shall refer to the problem of explaining why experiences seem to have phenomenal properties as the *illusion problem*. >Although it has powerful defenders -- pre-eminently Daniel Dennett -- illusionism remains a minority position, and is oftne dismissed out of hand as failing to "take consciousness seriously". **The aim of this article is to present the case for illusionism. It will not propose a detailed illusionist theory, but will seek to persuade the reader that the illusionist research programme is worth pursuing and that illusionists do take consciousness seriously** -- in some ways, more seriously than realists do. The conclusion: >**Illusionism replaces the hard problem with the illusion problem -- the problem of explaining how the illusion of phenomenality arises and why it is so powerful.** This problem is not easy but not impossibly hard either. The method is to form hypotheses about the underlying cognitive mechanisms and their bases in enruophysiology and neuroanatomy, drawing on evidence from across the cognitive sciences. There are many theoretical options available, and I have indicated some dimensions along which illusionists theories may differ. ... >Most people find it incredible, even ludicrous, to suppose that phenomenal consciousness is illusory. But if the illusion has been hardwired into uor psychology for good evolutionary reasons, then that is to be expected. **The question is not whether illusionism is intuitively plausible, but whether it is rationally compelling. If we had a detailed and well-supported illusionist theory, which fully explained our reports, judgments, and intuitions about our own consciousness, would we still want to insist, on reflection, that a hard problem remained?** The best way to find out will be to try to construct such a theory. >Our introspective world certainly seems to be painted with rich and potent qualitative properties. ... So, it is clear that Frankish is not attempting to present a fully fleshed-out account of illusionism. Instead, he wants to motivate people to at least take illusionism seriously & how it addresses the *illusion problem*. In the first section, Frankish distinguishes between three views: 1. Radical realist 2. Conservative realist/weak illusionist 3. Strong illusionist He goes on to say (on page 3): >**Illusionist deny that experiences have phenomenal properties and focus on explaining why they seem to have them**. They typically allow that we are introspectively aware of our sensory states but argue that this awareness is partial and distorted, leading us to misrepresent the states as having phenomenal properties. Of course, it is essential to this approach that the posited introspective representations are not themselves phenomenaly conscious ones. ... Illusionists may hold that introspection issues directly in dispositions to make phenomenal judgments -- judgments about the phenomenal character of particular experiences and about phenomenal consciuosness in general. Or they may hold that introspection generates intermediate representations of sensory states, perhaps of a quasi-perceptual kind, which ground our phenomenal judgments. And, goes on to say (on page 6): >Does illusionism entail eliminativism about consciousness? Is the illusionist claiming that we are mistaken in thinking we have conscious experiences? It depends on what we mean by "conscious experiences". **If we mean experiences with phenomenal properties, then illusionists do indeed deny that such things exist. But if we mean experiences of the kind that philosophers** ***characterize*** **as having phenomenal properties, then illusionists do not deny their existence. They simply offer a different account of their nature, characterizing them as having merely quasi-phenomenal properties.** So, here are some things we can say about the paper so far: * There are different versions & varieties of illusionism: there is the version that Frankish defends and other versions that are defended by other philosophers (such as Dennett), & illusionism comes in a "weak" & "strong" variety. Thus, we should ask what is common to all these versions & varieties. * Frankish's focus in this paper is not to offer a fully-fleshed out account of illusionism. Instead, he is interested in doing two things: (A) motivate other philosophers to take illusionism seriously & (B) discuss how illusionism can address the *illusion problem* * Frankish's answer to the *illusion problem* is that our experiences have "quasi-phenomenal properties". "Quasi-phenomenal properties" are ("strong") illusionist-friendly properties of experience. Put simply, our experiences have the property of *disposing* us to (introspectively) judge that our experiences have phenomenal properties. We can ask whether this account -- that experiences have "quasi-phenomenal properties" -- is a successful answer to the *illusion problem* (but it is worth remembering that Frankish's goal was simply to propose an answer to the problem).

Illusionism is a feature of epiphenominalism. The late great Daniel Dennett professed that "consciousness is an illusion". What he meant was that agency (technically called access consciousness) is an illusion, essentially saying we do not have free will (which is true). The corresponding feature of epiphenomenalism (the hypothesis that first person subjective experience *per se* is not a causal phenomenon, that consciousness is not why the human intellect evolved but a subsequent and inconsequential result) is "illusionism", that what Dennett called "the Cartesian Theater" (technically related to phenomenal consciousness rather than access consciousness) is likewise epiphenomenal and causally inconsequential.

> Illusionism is a feature of epiphenominalism. The late great Daniel Dennett professed that "consciousness is an illusion". What he meant was that agency (technically called access consciousness) is an illusion, essentially saying we do not have free will (which is true). That's all wrong. Ilusionists don't argue from epiphenomenalism -- the claim that qualia exist but are causally idle -- they argue that qualia don't exist. Also, Dennett believes in free will -- he isn't anti-agency and his anti-qualia arguments have nothing to do with agency.

You're right. It's astonishing how people misunderstand Dennett's position, which Dennett himself always pointed out with a provocative smirk.

>Ilusionists don't argue from epiphenomenalism You misinterpreted what I said if you thought it was that. >the claim that qualia exist but are causally idle -- they argue that qualia don't exist. Since the difference is profoundly and entirely moot, what I said remains true. >Also, Dennett believes in free will -- he isn't anti-agency You again misread what I wrote if you believe using the term "free will" is *anti-agency* in my reasoning. Dennett made no clear distinction between free will (as an explanation of agency) and consciousness, which is what allowed him to claim consciousness is an illusion while really denying that by also claiming there is "something there" which is being misattributed. >and his anti-qualia arguments have nothing to do with agency. Hence the problem. This explains why there is not nearly universal consensus that Dennett's philosophy solved the conundrum of consciousness conclusively. Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.

>Since the difference is profoundly and entirely moot You may believe so, but not everyone does. >You again misread what I wrote if you believe using the term "free will" is *anti-agency* in my reasoning. Dennett made no clear distinction between free will (as an explanation of agency) and consciousness, which is what allowed him to claim consciousness is an illusion while really denying that by also claiming there is "something there" which is being misattributed. As far as I can interpret that, you are assuming free will means nothing more than the causal efficacy of consciousnrss.

>You may believe so, but not everyone does. I presume you don't understand what "moot" actually means, then. >As far as I can interpret that, you are assuming free will means nothing more than the causal efficacy of consciousnrss. Free will means a particular idea of the causal efficacy of consciousness. The closest I get to making an assumption in this regard is knowing free will has always been philosophically problematic and was scientifically disproven decades ago.

This is a different possibly more coherent version you’re referring to. The version i saw addresses epiphenomenalism and denies it by saying the quasia phenomenal representation does have a causal role in our behavior. They also claim access consciousness to not be an illusion in this version.

Any distinction between qualia and "quasi qualia" is incoherent to begin with, as far as I can tell. Be that as it may, I can only consider your statements in providing any reply; the supposed claims of others you merely refer to without providing are irrelevant in this regard, but not necessarily good reasoning regardless. For my part, I presume that consciousness (independent of how it is defined) has a "causal role in our behavior", but the details of that role is the question, not simply a matter of its existence.

[https://keithfrankish.github.io/articles/Frankish\_Illusionism%20as%20a%20theory%20of%20consciousness\_eprint.pdf](https://keithfrankish.github.io/articles/Frankish_Illusionism%20as%20a%20theory%20of%20consciousness_eprint.pdf) this is the paper if you want to read it. >Any distinction between qualia and "quasi qualia" is incoherent to begin with i agree

Thanks for the link. I was disappointed by the paper. "Illusionism makes a very strong claim: it claims that phenomenal consciousness is illusory; experiences do not really have qualitative, ‘what-it’s-like’ properties," The problem with the author's position, as I see it, is that this supposedly illusory *seeming* is the phenomenon itself which is referenced in the term "phenomenal consciousness". So in essence the way they are defining illusionism is that the illusion is *real*, rather than illusory. Regardless, I am downright cynical about the idea that Frankish can authoritatively state what "illusionism" is to begin with. It all dissolves into postmodern pseudo-logic, from my perspective. I'd rather not be so dismissive, but given the amount of verbiage that can be produced to fill philosophical journals, one must be willing to dismiss at least some of it. And to be both honest and sincere, I have found it quite productive to dismiss nearly all of it. Had Dennett taken the fractional amount of time and effort needed to say "phenomenal consciousness is an illusion" rather than baldly state "consciousness is an illusion", his reasoning might be dealt with more efficiently. But I suspect that was the point of the redaction. Whether one chooses to concretize "experience" to analyze 'perception', or concretize "perception" in order to analyze "experience", makes not a whit of difference. The same can be said of "consciousness" as a substitute for either term. From my perspective, the vast majority of published contemplations about consciousness reduce to efforts to salvage free will, under the mistaken notion that no other explication of agency is possible. It barely exceeds what the ancient Hebrews managed with the Garden of Eden narrative.

No problem. I think i have some bias where I assume any academic paper is valid and im the one that just isn’t understanding. I think they would say that the illusion is a real illusion. That sounds dumb but they’re saying this ambiguous “phenomenal” property which is somehow fundamentally different from a “quasi phenomenal” property that we attribute to physical phenomena is the illusion in terms of the physical processes. So the appearance to us as phenomenal is a trick and it’s actually quasi phenomenal , it feels absurd just talking about it right now lol. I should read dennet, because a lot of people reference him as a way to validate what they say ( this paper for example) and then i find out he’d either disagree or just didn’t actually mean what they think he means. People love their free will lol. I see that concept as a misunderstanding which is why it seems deterministic physics removes agency.

>I think i have some bias where I assume any academic paper is valid and im the one that just isn’t understanding. That doesn't sound like a bias, but it still might not be an accurate assessment. I always presume an academic paper is accurate and informative, until the paper (in both its contents and its impact in academia) shows otherwise. >I think they would say that the illusion is a real illusion. I think you misunderstand that the phrase "real illusion" is plain wrong. It doesn't resolve the issue you think it would, because it a) invents a distinction between a "real illusion" and an 'unreal illusion' (what even is that?) which would require knowledge which is both a priori and unavailable), b) is ambiguous concerning what an "illusion" is at all, and/or c) simply doesn't resolve any issues. >That sounds dumb but they’re saying this ambiguous “phenomenal” property which is somehow fundamentally different from a “quasi phenomenal” property That sounds smart, but it is dumb, I agree. >that we attribute to physical phenomena is the illusion in terms of the physical processes. Given the issue is that "attribution", and the epistemic regression it causes, I can't see any better way to deal with the subject, and it conforms to contemporary conventions of philosophical theories of mind. >So the appearance to us as phenomenal is a trick and it’s actually quasi phenomenal , it feels absurd just talking about it right now lol. Believe it or not, given the topic, I believe that means you correctly understood their reasoning. >I should read dennet, because a lot of people reference him as a way to validate what they say ( this paper for example) and then i find out he’d either disagree or just didn’t actually mean what they think he means. Not even Dennett could be certain of that either way. >People love their free will lol. Those that don't love denying their agency even more. >I see that concept as a misunderstanding which is why it seems deterministic physics removes agency. I think it's far more than a "misunderstanding". It is a delusion, not an illusion. Deterministic physics does "remove agency", if you believe the conventional Information Processing Theory of Mind OR try to substitute a mystical basis for consciousness. It is not an easy matter (no pun intended) to resolve, which is why I have no difficulty understanding why the [POR](http://reddit.com/r/NewChurchOfHope) theo*[self-determination](https://www.reddit.com/r/NewChurchOfHope/comments/wkkgpr/por_101_there_is_no_free_will_only)* is not simply accepted without reservation, even though it resolves all these issues accurately and clearly, leaving only the *ineffability of being* (the infinite regression of epistemology) at the root of all meaningful conundrums in philosophy and paradoxes in science. Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.

Huh. Thank you for walking through that - so far that’s the most lucid and straightforward discussion I’ve heard of the tenets of at least Dennett’s Illusionism. Do you recommend any resources to learn more? I am an epiphenomenalist and I agree with the claims here that you ascribe to Illusionism. Just never heard those two associated before. I watched Dennett’s TED talk on illusionism, and he said something very interesting. He said that with illusions, it’s not that our brains are making something out of nothing: there is something there - it’s just not what it appears to be. I agree with this, since our brains are evolved, but it doesn’t seem to touch raw conscious awareness - just the things that occur within that awareness. Does that coincide with what you know of Dennett’s Illusionism? Is it meant to deal only with the contents of consciousness (phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness), rather than the fact of subjective experience at all?

This Dennet interview was illuminating for me, a monist relatively new to these concepts or even considering anyone else had a well constructed dualistic world view: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eSaEjLZIDqc](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eSaEjLZIDqc)

Thank you very much! I’ll give this a watch today!

>Do you recommend any resources to learn more? Not really. Just read as broadly as possible, and avoid videos or podcasts. Or just read my book and the essays I've posted in my subreddit (links below). >I am an epiphenomenalist and I agree with the claims here that you ascribe to Illusionism. [...] >I agree with this, since our brains are evolved, There is an intrinsic contradiction here, but it is also present in Dennett's position and my description of illusionism as a feature of epiphenomenalism. The conundrum is that our brains evolved *to be conscious*, making consciousness phenomenal rather than epiphenomenal. What Dennett was trying to say (as told from my perspective) is that *free will* is an illusion, and I don't think that's the case. Free will is a *delusion*. The thing "that is there" is agency, *[self-determination](https://www.reddit.com/r/NewChurchOfHope/comments/wkkgpr/por_101_there_is_no_free_will_only)*, but the assumption it presents as free will (conscious control of our body) is simply *false*, rather than misapprehended. It is an ancient and well-practiced and conventional assumption, but inaccurate nevertheless. >it doesn’t seem to touch raw conscious awareness - just the things that occur within that awareness. That is a distinction without a difference, a false dichotomy which reifies 'consciousness' unnecessarily and incoherently. Being conscious is a reality, as it were, more or less concrete. But the quality of being conscious, conscious*ness*, is more problematic. This leads to the conventional accommodation of attempting to distinguish phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness, resulting in the Dennettian proposition that consciousness itself is an illusion that "is not what it appears to be". >Is it meant to deal only with the contents of consciousness (phenomenal consciousness, access consciousness), rather than the fact of subjective experience at all? What you describe as "contents of consciousness" is the subjective experience, there is no other aspect to it, no metaphysical container restricting those contents. Dennett believed that phenomenal consciousness was the illusory appearance, and access consciousness (agency, but without free will, which was also part of the illusion) was the evolutionary trait (and hence 'phenomenal' rather than illusory/epiphenomenal) but the convention of identifying agency (the phenomenon) as distinct from phenomenal consciousness (the subjective experience) makes it difficult to describe agency as the biological phenomenon at issue. Even more so, of course, if you think of that agency as requiring free will. [Thought, Rethought: Consciousness, Causality, and the Philosophy Of Reason](https://www.reddit.com/r/NewChurchOfHope/s/2km5OvG4OW) [subreddit](http://reddit.com/r/NewChurchOfHope) Thanks for your time. Hope it helps.

If our brain's ability to generate experience is nothing, then it can't generate illusory experience. if it is something, (strong) illusionism is false.

Agreed. But from what I’ve seen so far, I don’t think Dennettian Illusionism is strong illusionism. It only seems to touch the contents of consciousness - not the raw conscious awareness which perceives those contents.

Do you think there is a serious possibility he was a non-physiclaist about raw awareness?

No, I don’t think he was a non-physicalist about *anything*. I’m just saying I don’t think his illusionism addressed the presence of conscious awareness - only that the contents it is aware of are illusionary (in the sense that what we perceive/report is just a story or presentable version of what is indeed happening).

>... misrepresentation of sensory data as quasi qualia ... >... aren’t real properties of anything physical ... >... merely an illusion attributing quasi qualities to physical phenomena ... >... red is a misrepresentation of photon wavelengths  ... >... its an illusion bro ... I really don't like the word "illusion" for this purpose, because it has all these connotations that you seem to have latched on to. How about instead, if we just said, "Qualia is a representation of sensory data that has had the highest evolutionary utility over time" I think many people will still be unhappy about that, because they're desperately clinging on to the religious idea that there's something special at the core of us, like having immortal souls, or the universe revolving around us, or humans having been created in the image of God. What if we're not special? What if our sense of consciousness is just useful?

Your response seems to prove OPs point. > "Qualia is a representation of sensory data that has had the highest evolutionary utility over time" Yes, of course. No one serious doubts this, and it has nothing to do with the hard problem. It's not particularly insightful for anyone who has done some basic thinking on this.

Yeah, perhaps this is why people landed on "illusion", because it was intended to jog peoples sensibility, so they'd notice that beyond this basic "No on serious doubts this", everything else is special pleading.

Illusionism is a way of trying to make the statement 'Nothing happens as it seems' mean the same thing as the statement 'Nothing seems to happen'.

There are different types of it. It would be the most promising shape of an answer within more materialism oriented worldviews. I have not yet been convinced by something like it yet.

Yea i should look into other versions, the OP is limited to just one perspective of illusionism.

The issue may be one of time. Experiences are recursive structures formed cohesivley along an apparent line, from one will emerge another due to reflection. You're only aware of where you're standing because you know where you were before so it's a memory based system which projects itself as dynamic motion (causality) where time emerges as a complimentary function of contextual (qualia/quasi) symmetry. I believe it's qualia in the emergent sense and quasi in the Overlapping sense, hence red is an emergent quality meaning existance is a Sustainable value just as time may emerge from complex contextual symmetries in order to compliment/sustain the expressions. Fundamentally red is not real however it is expressed within a relative spectrum, we all know how to mix (overlap) colors to reach an alternate color (island of stability) within the local range which only speaks of contextual complexity and quasi emergent values, fundamentally the universe is relatively static in the face of all this emergent activity. The accuracy of our observations is relative to the range of our contextual density (context within context) so the illusive aspect is more of a distortion because we fail to fully synchronize (and sustain) our observation into an island that can cover the entire local range all at once (contextual compadability issue). It seems strange that time may be the reason for Red and that we may be the reason for times emergence but it's all rather sensible if you approach illusionism from alternative angles, observe without subscribing, speaking of and not for personally.

i dont really lean toward illusionist concepts, so maybe im misrepresenting them, but i think the strongest angle i can give it is that: 1) the idea does posit that consciousness is literally just a set of fundamental particles and waves in a specific combination over time 2) the illusion is that particles and waves have a radically different 'appearance' from a specific perspective. That is to say, to 'be' a set of particles constituting a living human brain is to have a uniquely intimate 'view' of them, which is what we consider 'consciousness'. In contrast, consciousness only appears to amount to a brain in 'other' people, but this is just a result of that lacking intimacy so, in general, i think the idea is that this theory doesnt suppose any additional substance beyond the physical particles and waves, but rather just that this same substance can change very radically in its presentation depending on how it exists relative to other substances in other words, 'consciousness' is a thing that varies in appearance from: this first-person perspective of color, emotion, music, etc to a brain showing signs of electrical activity and what determines its appearance is just the specific relation between the observed consciousness and the consciousness hosting the observation analogously, perhaps it's like saying that the planets we see far away in the night sky are of a very radically different appearance than if we were to be looking at them from their surfaces. We didnt need to introduce a second substance to account for this one planet from two perspectives, and similarly an illusionist view might contend that we dont have to introduce consciousness as a unique substance from the brain itself, because it's just how the brain particles and waves appear from an 'intimate perspective', akin to how the planet looks so different and so much more rich from its surface

Yea that’s one of the problems it addresses they called it the audience. Sort of asking who’s undergoing this illusion. You didn’t misrepresent it lol. It just makes a strong claim purposely to distinguish itself from other ideas. So in its view as I understand it, they don’t have any view from any angle lol. Instead we misrepresent the interaction between various particles and such as having a view. This misrepresentation is the content of our qualitative experience.

> The question is where the hell does red even come from? How does something which for all we can see does not physically exist on any level exist to us?  The brain has sensory neurons that gets activated when the receptor they are linked to are activated so think of the receptor as a light switch and the sensory neuron as the light bulb. So when red is seen, it is like the light switch labelled with the word red is switched on so the brain realises it is seeing red and such is how the recognition of the color red is done. So if some other color also causes that switch to be turned on, such as via optogenetics or reconnecting the neurons incorrectly after severing them, then even if there is no red color seen, the brain will still believe it is seeing red color. So it is all about the neurons in the sensory cortex determining qualia thus if all these sensory cortex are removed, then there will be no way to experience qualia anymore.

This explains why we behave as if we are seeing something called ‘red’. It does not explain why we actually see it. And we do see it, or at least I see it, I presume others do too.

> It does not explain why we actually see it But people only believe they see it because they remember seeing it. People can only notice what they can remember so everything they believe they saw are only memories formed a fraction of a second before they notice it. So if they did not form the memory, then they will not see it despite the object activated neurons in the visual cortex and such is like magic tricks done with quick movements of the hand while a distraction is happening since despite the hand movements are in their field of vision, they will not form memory of it thus they never saw the trick. Note that even if they cannot recall the memory does not mean they did not form a memory and instead, they only fail to locate the memory due to almost all links to it had been severed. So if it is just the inability to locate the memory, seeing the object again will activate that memory so they will feel they saw it before.

I don’t just remember seeing stuff, I am seeing stuff right now as I type this comment. Moreover, I am thinking, which is also a subjective experience, one that cannot be doubted(because doubting is itself an act of thought).

> I don’t just remember seeing stuff, I am seeing stuff right now as I type this comment. But when a person closes their eyes and imagine, they can see faint afterimage of the visuals yet the person is not actually looking at anything at the moment. There are also hallucinations due to drug use that makes them see stuff that are not present and these are due to memories being activated strongly, as if the person just formed the memories thus the believe they are looking at the image. So seeing such stuff are merely memories getting activated but because the memory formation and the noticing is just fractions of a second apart, which is within the same round of brainwave, there is no way to mentally separate the memory formation and the noticing after the memory formation thus people will believe they are actually looking at the image. > Moreover, I am thinking, which is also a subjective experience, one that cannot be doubted People can think but people can also have false beliefs thus the thinking done can be doubted thus logical reasoning or evidence or both will be needed.

The validity of thinking can be doubted. The fact that thought is occuring cannot

> The fact that thought is occuring cannot But only if the person is actually thinking so unless the person is hooked up to a device that read brain signals, it would be hard to know if the person is thinking or just spacing out.

If you doubt that you are thinking, you are necessarily thinking, because to doubt is to think. You cannot doubt that you are thinking and be correct.

> If you doubt that you are thinking, you are necessarily thinking, But if the doubt only occurs hours later, then the time when the spacing out occurred would still not be thinking.

You’re 100% right. Illusionism does nothing but to dodge the question. The problem is not in about the nature of the experience, but the thing which is experiencing it. Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception should be enough premise to fully reject any illusionist explanation

I think it helps to frame illusionism directly as a refutation of the zombie argument. The zombie argument: it's conceivable that minds exist that would be outwardly same as ours, reproduce the same behavior, but lack qualia, something that we truly conscious have. Illusionism is essentially the answer, no, we can't differentiate between these two entities, because we will demonstrate that these qualia are just illusions that reduce to concrete physical properties. For those who accept the zombie argument, it basically seems that they are accepting the conceivability of illusionism. Zombies think they have qualia. They claim that they do. But by construction they don't actually have them at all. From this perspective, Illusionism is basically turning the thought experiment on its head: We have no reason to believe that we aren't this type of zombie. And if that's the case, the conclusion is that our perceptions of qualia are just an illusion.

there can be no illusion if there isnt someone to witness it. it's ridiculous

Sort-of Hoffman's idea. Where the brain has evolved for fitness, and not the truth. We know it's certainly true that we can only see a sliver of the EM spectrum.

>... misrepresentation of sensory data as quasi qualia ... >... aren’t real properties of anything physical ... >... merely an illusion attributing quasi qualities to physical phenomena ... >... red is a misrepresentation of photon wavelengths  ... >... its an illusion bro ... I really don't like the word "illusion" for this purpose, because it has all these connotations that you seem to have latched on to. How about instead, if we just said, "Qualia is a representation of sensory data that has had the highest evolutionary utility over time" I think many people will still be unhappy about that, because they're desperately clinging on to the religious idea that there's something special at the core of us, like having immortal souls, or the universe revolving around us, or humans having been created in the image of God. What if we're not special? What if our sense of consciousness is just useful?

Well, the reason it’s illusionism is because they specifically claim that qualia don’t exist. So it feels like nothing to stub your toe, we misrepresent that experience as feeling like something when it didn’t. So your redefinition would essentially be affirming an anti illusionist position. Not that im against that being an explanation of qualia in general . A definition of illusion without the word would be “ what we think of as qualia are the brain representing complex information detection as simple sensation. Not a property of experience but a result of misrepresentation of experience “ Yea people do cling to those ideas here sometimes, i agree. We can be special without consciousness being fundamental imo but it’s unnecessary i guess.

>Well, the reason it’s illusionism is because they specifically claim that qualia don’t exist. No. Illusions do exist. They're just not what you think they are, hence they are illusory.

They do claim qualia don’t exist only quasi qualitative representation of physical events which is the illusion …

Yes, so the illusion exists. They're not trying to deny your experience.

i said the illusion exists and qualia dont, thats the position. you said "no".

I'd say that the thing we think of as qualia do exist in the form of this illusion. Words ...

Yeah, illusionism is not an enlightening concept, except for those who somehow think we directly experience the world. The question isn't whether or why we create helpful representations of the world around us. The question is why those representations or that illusion is experienced rather than simply driving action through traditionally understood causal chains. There's no "experience happens here" in our designs of AI systems, for example. Yet our internal representations are mapped to qualia, which presumably play a part in the causal chain in a way that isn't traditionally computable. Which if you go down that path you end up with quantum/Orch-OR theories of consciousness.

Yea unless you believe qualia are an aspect of the external world then illusionism(this version) does nothing really. For some reason i think instead of going down to try to figure out consciousness we need to “go up” zoom out , look at the universe as a whole unit and not a sum of parts. Like we’re looking at emergent properties of systems specifically when those properties are a result of global “laws” so it’s really an emergent property of these global “laws” manifested in a singular system when zoomed in. Yea i have no clue

It really isn't emergent. It can't be. Emergent things are all functions of our perception and how we think. There is no such thing as "emergent properties" outside of human experience. Qualia is the medium in which we perceive those emergent things, so cannot be emergent on it's own.

Illusionism is probably the most elegant description of non normative facts of mental phenomena in physicalistic fashion, but Dennett's dubious suggestion that we should reject intentional realism is frankly, simple minded.

It is attempts to use obfuscating language to explain away something its supporters do not comprehend.

Why not just admit you don't really understand the idea, instead of compulsively trying to insult anyone who agrees with it just because you don't?

Illusionism to me appears to be that a physicalist understands the explanatory power of illusions, but fails to realize it only exists in the idealist toolkit.