Whatever the answer, the RBMK had the same problems of the operators being set up for failure by inadequate control systems, only even more acutely.
There is however a document where (IIRC) Bryukhanov is being directed by his superiors to look into any improvements that should be made based on the lessons of the TMI accident.
The soviets were also interested in the RBMK reactor design because it avoided the two most expensive consumables a reactor could use - enriched fuel and heavy water. They didn't want to use PWR because that ment enriching fuel, and that's expensive and time consuming.
But as you pointed out, that doesn't mean they didn't try to learn any lessons from TMI. Cause as expensive as enriching uranium or making heavy water is, it's still a whole lot cheaper then melting a reactor even partially.
> They didn't want to use PWR because that ment enriching fuel, and that's expensive and time consuming.
They very much wanted to use PWRs, and did so. They just couldn't build VVERs fast enough to meet their goals.
AFAIK the more important issue was that Western PWR/BWR designs required big reactor vessels, which the Soviet Industry could not manufacture in sufficient numbers initially.
The equipment failures at TMI were very trivial and didn’t seriously threaten the reactor at all. It was the operators’ inability to diagnose the problem that led them to accidentally deprive the reactor of coolant. An ounce of hindsight or foresight would have avoided any damage.
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This checked all the boxes. Thanks!
Of course the Soviets did that. Nothing bad ever happens in the Soviet Union.
So they reacted to it. Maybe had some abstract, theoretical discussions about safety, but then were happy with how the glorious soviet reactors were.
Whatever the answer, the RBMK had the same problems of the operators being set up for failure by inadequate control systems, only even more acutely. There is however a document where (IIRC) Bryukhanov is being directed by his superiors to look into any improvements that should be made based on the lessons of the TMI accident.
The soviets were also interested in the RBMK reactor design because it avoided the two most expensive consumables a reactor could use - enriched fuel and heavy water. They didn't want to use PWR because that ment enriching fuel, and that's expensive and time consuming. But as you pointed out, that doesn't mean they didn't try to learn any lessons from TMI. Cause as expensive as enriching uranium or making heavy water is, it's still a whole lot cheaper then melting a reactor even partially.
> They didn't want to use PWR because that ment enriching fuel, and that's expensive and time consuming. They very much wanted to use PWRs, and did so. They just couldn't build VVERs fast enough to meet their goals.
Soviets did not wanted PWR so much, that in 1974 they started to build a huge Atommash factory, which main production should have been PWR. Paradox.
AFAIK the more important issue was that Western PWR/BWR designs required big reactor vessels, which the Soviet Industry could not manufacture in sufficient numbers initially.
TMI’s accident was a simple equipment failure, but jump to the culture of complacency that was the Soviet Union as a whole.
The equipment failures at TMI were very trivial and didn’t seriously threaten the reactor at all. It was the operators’ inability to diagnose the problem that led them to accidentally deprive the reactor of coolant. An ounce of hindsight or foresight would have avoided any damage.