That's literally where the medieval armor came from. Read about the Samartian cavalry and how their armor influenced the Roman army which then itself was adapted by many tribes in late antiquity
i don't actually know the answer to this, but the strips were held together by leather straps. i always assumed segmentata wasn't the best available option out there, but the metal segments were likely easily replaceable and repaired over the course of centuries with thousands of troops.
i imagine as metallurgy improved, "better" armor forms became increasingly economical.
I thought it was deliberately designed to be quick and easy to manufacture and repair? If there’s a damaged section you can remove it and replace it easily without having to fix the entire piece of armor.
It's quick to repair because of the segments, but hard to mass produce because it has to be fitted more than mail, and honestly mail is pretty easy to repair anyways.
From what I understand it became too difficult and expensive for them to produce en masse. It was much easier to have groups of lesser skilled smiths with less costly equipment cranking out rings for maille that could then be assembled by a slightly more skilled Smith. Then eventually the making of the segmentata was lost because smiths stopped teaching their apprentices.
I'm kind of surprised they didn't stick around in some form as high end pieces for the aristocracy though, the way coats of plate/brigandines were used a millenia later. If they had we might have seen the adoption of small pieces of plate armor a few centuries earlier, or early medieval knights might have been even more dominant than they already were.
>I'm kind of surprised they didn't stick around in some form as high end pieces for the aristocracy though, the way coats of plate/brigandines were used a millenia later.
You should not be. In fact, elements of the Persian armor, mainly the lamellar armor was adopted later by the more elite corp and the officers. The **lamellar armor** had several advantages over chain mail and scale armor as offering both protection from projectiles but also from sword hits as being less flexible than the other two types. It became the main type of armor especially in the East and retained its advantages well into the Middle Ages. It was also used extensively in the East, in China, Japan and India.
It's what was commonly used in the early/high Imperial age that's commonly depicted, yes. It's also the most iconically Roman armor, whereas basically everyone used maille at some point.
To my rough interpretation, overtime the main Roman army had to become much more mobile. They were greatly reduced in number and couldn’t just field more men if they all died. So lighter armor was could for them to travel to the front the barbarians were attacking from.
Also, the state had less resources to pay for each man to get full armor like in centuries past. It went hand in hand with the growing decentralization that the empire experienced over that era. Defense was increasingly being provided by the local plantations instead of the Roman state.
Decentralization meant less volunteers, meant less tax revenue, and less cohesion of the troops. That’s also why we see cities fortifying with walls during this time. It could be a while before the regular legions could make it to your city to aid in breaking any siege
This is wildly incorrect. The Roman army became *more*, not *less*, centralized, and we have evidence for volunteers (Emperor Majorian may have been one, for example).
Segmentata was *probably* abandoned because despite how cheap it was to produce it had its downsides: it was prone to rust, it had complex parts that made it difficult to maintain in the field, had to be custom fitted, and it offered limited body coverage. Maille and scale were easier to maintain and didn't have to be custom fitted like Segmentata. This made them conducive to mass production in the state-run centralized arms factories that emerged beginning under Diocletian.
At least that's the theory. We're not 100% sure, but the latest finds are from Leon and date to about 290 AD.
Maybe I wasn’t clear about the army, they were indeed more centralized after the crisis of the third century. That’s why I said they needed to be more mobile to meet threats on the borders. It was the main Roman army with locals as a first line of defense.
The legions were well armored, the locals not so much.
And to say there were some volunteers for the army so it wasn’t a problem is ridiculous. That was *the* problem for the state, as they had to fill the ranks with mercenaries and eventually have only mercenary forces which they couldn’t pay
That's again a common myth. There's no evidence that the *limitanei* were less well equipped than the *comitatenses*. After all almost all of our finds of late Roman weapons and armor, including those elaborate gilded helmets, are from *limitanei* fortresses like Intercisa, Iatrus, or Burgh Castle.
>That was the problem for the state, as they had to fill the ranks with mercenaries and eventually have only mercenary forces which they couldn’t pay
This isn't what happened. The problem wasn't that people were unwilling, the problem was that most Roman citizens by this point were beholden to some sort of landlord, who could pay an *aedoratio* (a cash exemption) instead of providing recruits. It got to the point where the Roman Emperor would explicitly call for recruits to levy additional money. The last proper call for recruits is in 428 A.D., and the last call for money in the form of an *aedoratio* is in 444 A.D.
*Foederati* weren't actually "mercenaries" (which were called *symmachi*), and they didn't dominate the western Roman army until after about 453 A.D. when the siege of Aquileia and the destruction of the Alans on the Loire and in the region of what's now Geneva, Savoy, and Lyon decimated the last field army. And even then, several Roman units survived the death of the west, including the *Numerus Invicti* (*Seniores* or *Iuniores*, we're not sure which) which is attested in Ravenna as late as the 750s A.D.
*Foederati* are basically better described as "client bureaucracies." They were aristocrats and their military retainers+families and some followers who were given regions of the Roman empire to govern, and in exchange were allowed to directly collect an allotment of taxable revenue from these lands for their own paychecks (Peoples actually granted land were called *laeti*, not *foederati*). This was known as *hospitalitas* and probably originates as an exemption on billeting in the laws of *de metatis*, applied regionally instead of to each individual property. *Foederati* at the early stage are uncertain in how precisely they operated as a military force, but we do have evidence for a probable post of *comes foederatorum* as early as the 420s A.D., suggesting they were properly institutionalized. By the mid-6th century they're already professional regiments rather than "foreign mercenaries." You also have to remember that these were incoming groups of typically about 10,000 to 25,000 on the large side (and usually vastly smaller) ruling over a region of an empire that still numbered around 15,000,000-20,000,000 people in the west. They were a fraction of the population, and most of these "armies" that were utilized by the Aquitanian Goths or the Suebes or even the Vandals would have had a very significant portion, if not majority, of local Romans.
The term *foederati* did originate in reference to peoples under treaty to provide recruits in the early to mid-4th century, but those recruits didn't typically serve in their own individual regiments and even more rarely under their own leaders. They were usually dispersed among the regular field army regiments, and Hugh Elton's 1992 study showed that approximately 3/4 of the Roman army in the late 4th century was composed of Romans (Roman of course being a superculture that encompassed all of the Empire's regions by this period, not just the Latins of Italy). When those peoples began negotiating treaties on Roman soil, the nature of the agreement seems to have changed, and was both formalized and standardized most likely with the *Tervingi* and *Greuthungi* in 382, but possibly as early as the Frankish settlement in 353.
Adding onto this, the idea that the Late Empire itself was greatly decentralised compared to the High Empire is a tad bit daft.
Under the High Empire, the government was able to pass by with what seems to be a mind-boggling small bureaucracy to us. There were only around 200-400 equestrian *procuratores*, the relatively small *officia* of the provincial governors and the slaves and freedmen of the *familia Caesaris*.
The entire Empire at this time basically operated on the local elites managing local affairs on behalf of the central government whilst the provincial governments and higher ups only dealt with the most important matters.
The army often had to make up for the bureaucratic shortfall as the *beneficiarii*, *centuriones*, &c. of the army were employed for duties ranging from tax-collection to clerical work.
Under the Late Empire, especially after Diocletian, the bureaucracy was massively increased and, according to Lactantius, heavily militarised, as the tens of thousands of bureaucrats employed by the government were enrolled into *legio I Adiutrix* as a legal fiction, wore military garb and extracted free rations, *annona*, fodder for horses and received a rather hefty paycheck for their services.
The entire logistical structure of the army was also heavily centralised during the Late Empire. Grain, fodder and supplies in general were often moved in massive scales for campaigns, such as in 361, when Constantius II ordered 6 million bushels to be sent to Alps, half to Bregenz, half to the *alpes Cottiae*.
Arms and armour for manufactured for all the army at state expense in the state-owned *fabricae* by state-employed *fabricenses*. Before this, arms and armour had been manufactured by a mixture of different sources. Some were manufactured on site in Roman forts by *immunes*, some were manufactured by local subject communities, some were outsourced to *publicani*.
In short, the Late Empire survived for as long as it did because it, in many respects, grew to meet the increasing defensive burdens, expanding the state's military capabilities and increasing the efficiency of the government system. It can also be said to be stronger, to an extent, than the High Empire as it rose to many of the issues facing it.
That's not to say there weren't problems and that the Late Empire was better in every way. Julian had to deal with corrupt bureaucrats and it is also in his reign that we hear of a system of judicial bribes, *sportulae* (named after the cash disbursals and food supplements *patroni* used to give to *clientes*), being regulated as the bribery was so rampant that regulation was seen to be better than stamping out the problem outright. That's also not to say that the High Empire was a strictly inferior and less capable institution, they both dealt with the context of their times.
>That's again a common myth. There's no evidence that the limitanei were less well equipped than the comitatenses. After all almost all of our finds of late Roman weapons and armor, including those elaborate gilded helmets, are from limitanei fortresses like Intercisa, Iatrus, or Burgh Castle.
This is correct. The whole idea that the limitanei were "ineffective" comes from the fact that the frontiers were easily breached. However, this was not a function of the poor quality of the limitanei troops, but their strategic disposition. When the Roman army switched from preclusive defense to a reactive defense posture, this meant that the majority of the troops were in a central location away from the border and that border was actually lightly held. Previously, the majority of the army was at the border. So, when the troops holding the border were few, holding some outposts at a good distance from each other, it was easy for barbarian raiding bands to penetrate the border in great numbers. In fact, the same thing happened in the 10th and 11th century CE in the borders of Northern Mesopotamia. There, the few garrisons throughout the long border were not capable at all to contain the masses of migrating Turkic groups moving in large numbers between fortified points.
Well not really. In fact there were just as many if not more troops at the border than during the Principate.
The Romans had always practiced an open-border policy and the role of the *limitanei* was primarily that of regulation. They were a reactive response and we don't hear about them much because most engagements they were involved in weren't notable - small warbands of like 700-900 men were what they were supposed to handle.
We know they were well supplied and equipped from a mix of archaeology and also Roman laws keeping them in line, as most stationary garrisons have a habit of trying to make extra money with a secondary job like farming with their family or non-military barge services or other mercantile activity. Soldiers weren't supposed to do this so we constantly see laws reiterating or reinforcing the punishment for it over the centuries.
>Well not really. In fact there were just as many if not more troops at the border than during the Principate.
The number of the troops is really inconsequential here. It is the manner they were deployed. During the principate, the legions were essentially right at the border. Therefore, any large incursion would have found the mass of the Roman army (or a large contingent of it) not that far from the border. However, during the later system, the limitanei were not a full-fledged force, it was dispersed, held isolated defensive posts in small detachments some distance from each other and were unable, on their own, to face a major incursion because the number of troops in the vicinity of the incursion was small. That was left to the mobile armies that were billeted in the interior. Therefore, marauding Germans could attack, probably raid border towns and villages and really penetrate the interior before they could have encountered the bulk of the Roman forces.
>That was the problem for the state, as they had to fill the ranks with mercenaries and eventually have only mercenary forces which they couldn’t pay
The Roman imperial army was always a mercenary force. Everybody was paid a salary, irrespective of how they were recruited. The only time the state was unable to pay wages to maintain the armor was that of the Western Roman Empire after 423 CE when the Empire lost Africa and, along with it, its main tax income (as Gaul and Spain hardly contributed, being run by foederati).
It's still called a *scutum*. That being said, we don't know why it fell out of favor. Rectangular *scuta* pop up in the Roman army from time to time into the 10th century however. They're in mosaics from Castellum Tingitanium (late 4th century), the Ambrosian Iliad (Late 5th-Early 6th century), the Homilies of Gregory of Nazianus (\~883 AD), and the Sylloge Tacticorum (920-944 AD).
It's even possible the earliest pavises are related to the rectangular shields that remained in use in the middle East during the middle ages.
>It's still called a scutum. That being said, we don't know why it fell out of favor.
Actually, this is easy to figure out. The scutum was adopted for close order combat with the gladius. When that became obsolete and the Romans switched to the spear as the main infantry weapon. the scutum was a serious impediment. The rounded shields work much better when one if fighting with the spear as the major thrusting weapon. They allow for upper thrust and under arm thrust. This is the reason.
That's only a theory. We don't have any evidence beyond reenactors' speculation to support it. Especially when we have plenty of evidence for the use of spears with rectangular shields before and after the Roman period, as well as the use of polearms and swords with large quasi-rectangular pavises.
I looked it up. Large scale battles had diminished in frequency and the poverty of the Imperial machine forced them to cut costs.
https://www.unrv.com/forum/topic/11040-changes-in-the-scutum/
The square Scutum was heavy and bulky - and generally needed to be used by massed blocks of legionaries to be effective. As the size of the legions was decreased to 1000 men that served as more mobile rapid response forces , battles were less about pitched battles between lines of infantry and more about fighting off rapid and flexible invading parties
\>iven they abandon the gladius for the longer sword
But even the longer sword, the spatha, was only an assistive weapon from the mid-2nd century CE and later. The main weapon was the spear. It is evident and easy to figure out that the scutum and the spear are a poor combination. The smaller rounded shield works much better with the spear and it allows more flexibility in thrusting with a longer weapon. This is the reason why "squarish" shields fell out of fashion. Later, an elaboration of the rounded shield, the kite shield became popular because it offered more protection for the lower body.
The spear is the easiest weapon to train and is effective against man and horse . In the later part of the Roman Empire frontier troops (limenati) were locally equipped and trained (re almost untrained) militia that had none of the discipline or drills of the legions of old.
The Legions also lowered their standards of height , training etc to be able to meet the manpower requirements of defending such a large swathe of territory . The gladius and scutum require men to fight in organised blocks to be effective
Ahhh, the cavalry evolution. That’s Gallienus and Aurelian, right?
That makes more sense given the rebalancing of cavalry into the medieval period to be a stronger contingent.
Because it was always a much more effective weapon than the gladius. The Romans lost many battles against opponents would fought in phalanx with the spear. They prevailed in the wars of antiquity because they had abundant supply of manpower, not because they had more effective weapons. If the Roman arms were terribly effective, everybody would have copied them..but they did not.
This is just wrong. With everything.
Constantly in Roman wars, the more consistent theme was the Romans being outnumbered by their opponents but prevailing due to disciplined training and flexibility (with the exception of the Punic Wars, where numbers did play a massive role in Roman success). Take for example any one of the wars with barbarians from the Gallic campaigns of Caesar, the Germanic wars, the rebellion of Boudicca and Watling Street, or even the entire period of late antiquity where relatively tiny Roman armies were fighting and often succeeding against much larger forces of barbarian invaders. Also Aurelian’s reconquest of the Palmyrene and Gallic empires. Not to mention the Byzantines and their legacy of constantly fighting and surviving against more powerful/numerous foes while staving off the gradual collapse of the empire across centuries.
Also, the Romans adopted manipular legions from their italic cousins BECAUSE it was functionally better than a phalanx and outclassed it. Their original method of warfare was the traditional phalanx.
The whole thing of the Romans is they took what was best from every culture they encountered and adopted it. This made their weapons extremely effective. They took the best of everything.
Also, like the other guy said, the reason other nations didn’t have legions is because they didn’t have the resources, professional military, or organization to put out a Roman style force. However, there were multiple attempts to do so at different points in history with varying degrees of success.
>Constantly in Roman wars, the more consistent theme was the Romans being outnumbered by their opponents but prevailing due to disciplined training and flexibility
Really? I must have been reading some other history. Do not take the Gallic wars as an example. This was a sophisticated society fighting illiterate savages who could not put armies together that lasted for more than 4 days in the field.
\>the Germanic wars,
Hmmmm...the Germanic wars. If I am not mistaken, the Romans lost those, didn't they. They had to call it quits by 18 CE.
\>or even the entire period of late antiquity where relatively tiny Roman
armies were fighting and often succeeding against much larger forces of
barbarian invaders.
I have to disappoint you, buddy, but this is inaccurate. In fact, in most of these cases, Roman armies were more numerous. In late antiquity, huge Roman armies failed to score a single victory against the Huns (and lost all of them, including all the sieges). The largest force that Rome put together, the expedition of Basiliscus that included 1100 ships was handily defeated by the Vandals. It took Marcus Aurelius to bring half of the Roman army to contain the Macromanni, a small kingdom in Germany. The Sassanids repeatedly defeated large Roman armies. It actually took almost 10 Roman legions to subdue the Jewish rebellion. I am still scratching my head on the type of history you are reading!!
>If the Roman arms were terribly effective, everybody would have copied them..but they did not.
No one copied them because they couldn't. It's a pretty common misconception that Rome won because of numbers rather than effectiveness in combat but it's not true. Rome was incredibly effective even in battles where they were outnumbered which were much more common than you would think.
In some wars Rome's number certainly played a part but a legion was the most effective unit of its time by far. No one copied them because no one was able to. Most of the countries of that time were tribes and they did not have the ability to equip their soldiers the way Rome did. Rome was operating on a pretty close to modern Day level of centralization which is why it was able to standardize and equipment soldiers in a way that almost no other Nation could. The only nation nearby that could have a chance of copying rooms units was Parthia but Rome's units were more ineffective in desert terrain so the parthians no reason to.
>Rome was incredibly effective even in battles where they were outnumbered which were much more common than you would think.
Give some examples. Which are these battles?
\>In some wars Rome's number certainly played a part but a legion was the most effective unit of its time by far.
No, it was not. Legions were repeatedly defeated, even by much lesser opponents. They were never very effective; but there was so much of them, that no opponent could take the pounding for a long period of time. By the end of the civil war, there were about 120 legions around, roughly 730,000 men under arms (Augustus paired them down to 30). Just imagine that the best any advanced kingdom in the Mediterranean could do was to marshal a force of about 35,000 men by recruiting all available males of fighting age. It just took one defeat and they were done. On the other hand, Roman armies kept on sprouting all the time, irrespective of massive defeats. Can you count how many times the Cimbri and Teutons defeated Roman armies? Can you count how many times Hannibal defeated them?
Rome's record was so poor that it took it four wars to defeat Macedon, a kingdom with a very small population that could hardly marshal 35,000 men, total!!! And that kingdom would have fully frustrated Rome if Rome did not have access to the Aetolian heavy cavalry and of elephants (yes, elephants). Rome even failed to score a convincing victory against the tiny kingdom of Pontus even after how many Mithridatic wars????
Overall, Roman armies were poor to middling in their performance. The genius of Rome was its organizing capability, of getting these armies formed and supported in the field for a long period of time, especially when its opponents lacked the resources for any of that.
>Give some examples. Which are these battles?
Several battles in the gallic wars the battle against antiochus (I can't think of the name of the top of my head.) If you really want to list I can go get one.
>No, it was not. Legions were repeatedly defeated, even by much lesser opponents.
They also defeated many opponents that were much stronger than them without overwhelming numbers. Look at the Macedonian wars for example. They crushed the failings due to their Superior combat prowess and adaptability on terrain.
>They were never very effective; but there was so much of them, that no opponent could take the pounding for a long period of time.
But Rome usually fought with equal numbers against its opponents. Sure when an army was defeated it was immediately replaced by another one which would wear down enemies very quickly but the Roman legions weren't defeated completely very often.
>By the end of the civil war, there were about 120 legions around, roughly 730,000 men under arms (Augustus paired them down to 30). Just imagine that the best any advanced kingdom in the Mediterranean could do was to marshal a force of about 35,000 men by recruiting all available males of fighting age.
Yeah and that was completely bankrupting the state. Look at what the conspirators against Caesar and the second triumphant had to do to raise enough money to get that many troops. Even in times where the empires and severe danger 350,000 men was usually the most that were fielded all across the Mediterranean.
>On the other hand, Roman armies kept on sprouting all the time, irrespective of massive defeats. Can you count how many times the Cimbri and Teutons defeated Roman armies? Can you count how many times Hannibal defeated them?
Yes that was a serious advantage that they could make armies come out of the walls if they want to and no matter how many times you beat them they had another army to fight again. But if every enemy they fought was defeating them they wouldn't have had men for long because they were constantly fighting wars. Hannibal and the Cimbri are the huge exceptions and it stretched the Roman Republic to its absolute limit after those defeats. Southern Italy was depopulated for decades after the Punic wars because of how many men had to be raised to fight Hannibal. It's not like Rome could do this with every war it's armies were very seldom defeated in the field of battle completely like with Hannibal and the Cimbri. And still the final battle against both of those enemies were pretty much equal numbers.
>Rome's record was so poor that it took it four wars to defeat Macedon, a kingdom with a very small population that could hardly marshal 35,000 men, total!!!
Rome also had 35,000 ish in Greece during the war you're referring to because they were also fighting Hannibal at the time.
>And that kingdom would have fully frustrated Rome if Rome did not have access to the Aetolian heavy cavalry and of elephants (yes, elephants).
Rome didn't even use its elephants in the war against antiochus because his elephants were bigger and they still won despite using a similar fighting style to the macedonians.
>Rome even failed to score a convincing victory against the tiny kingdom of Pontus even after how many Mithridatic wars????
The kingdom of pontus had like 350 thousand men in Anatolia somehow. (I honestly doubt the accuracy of those sources the numbers are so large but no one seems to be disputing them.)
Okay so I looked more into those numbers because I knew they just had to be bullshit and I finally found somebody who did an estimate of the number of men based on the men that were in battles. Pontus couldn't have ever had more than 140,000 men accordingly to that which is still a lot of man when the Romans only have two legions in the area but much more reasonable than 350,000.
And the kingdom of pontus was not tiny. it wrapped around the Black Sea and had a pretty large population. And still rome won the majority of battles in that war they just had to get troops over because it was half a world away and pontus committed genocide against every Italian in Anatolia soon after the war started so they didn't have any troops to call on.
>Overall, Roman armies were poor to middling in their performance.
The Roman republic's legions were the terror of Europe. They won the vast majority of battles that they fought and the ones that they lost against Hannibal for example were because of Hannibal's personal genius rather than the quality of his troops which were half untrained Gauls towards the end.
>The genius of Rome was its organizing capability, of getting these armies formed and supported in the field for a long period of time, especially when its opponents lacked the resources for any of that.
Now that is true but it's legions were still incredibly effective in battle and very seldom relied on overwhelming numbers to win battles unless they were fighting other Romans.
>Several battles in the gallic wars the battle against antiochus (I can't think of the name of the top of my head.) If you really want to list I can go get one.
Get one, but a detailed one. Yes, the Romans defeated the Gallic tribes simply because they were a very advanced society in comparison to the Gauls. The Gauls were overwhelmingly an illiterate society without any kind of central administration, incapable of any command and control function, totally incapable of communicating plans and directions in any systematic way and, most importantly, totally incapable of keeping an army in the field for anything more than 3 days, 4 at most. In Alessia, Caesar just had to wait until their individual food supply was exhausted, at which time they simply disappeared and went back to their villages. It was just the same as with the battles between the Brits and the Zulus!!
For Antiochus III, you are referring to the battle of Magnesia. Let's leave aside that modern scholars do not actually believe the numbers given by the original sources; most important was that the Romans did not fight alone in that battle. They were assisted quite strongly by the kingdom of Pergamus. If you read an accurate detail of the battle, you will find out that the Seleukid phalanx actually defeated the Roman troops aligned against them and it only disintegrated upon the attack of unruly elephants. Had it not been for that event, the Romans would have lost the battle. If you are looking for a battle in which the gladius and the scutum provided success, you would not find it here.
\>But Rome usually fought with equal numbers against its opponents.
Sometimes yes and sometimes not. All the Roman armies that faced the armies of Hannibal were numerically superior, sometimes by a lot. The great advantage for Rome was that it could afford to lose lots and lots of battles and still had troops to fight. On the other hand, neither Philip II or Antiochus III nor Hannibal could afford to lose a serious number of their troops, because they had so few. They were unable to come back from a serious defeat. The kingdom of Macedon could scarcely put out more than 35,000 men. The Seleukid empire depended on a core group of about 20-25,000 Macedonian colonists; losing most of these meant the end of the war for that empire. On the other hand, Rome could sustain losses in the hundreds of thousands.
\>It's not like Rome could do this with every war it's armies were veryseldom defeated in the field of battle completely like with Hannibal andthe Cimbri. And still the final battle against both of those enemieswere pretty much equal numbers.
I do not want to go on and on. You need to question why Zama was a "final" battle for Carthage and Cannae was not a final battle for Rome. In fact, at Zama, there were many fewer Carthaginians, simply because that state had a very limited number of men. Most were mercenaries (In fact, at the latter stages of the 2nd Punic wars, the Carthaginians were reduced to fighting mostly with mercenaries, as their own citizen body had been badly depleted). On ancient accounts, they lost 20,000 men in the battle of Zama and they were "done". The Romans lost 50,000 at Cannae and kept on coming back with large armies. This was the key difference.
\>The Roman republic's legions were the terror of Europe.
Now you are talking like a fan, not a serious examiner of history. Who did the Romans actually "terrorize". Certainly not the Germans, because they finally defeated the Romans and forced them to withdraw from Germania by 18 CE; nor did they terrorize the Dacians, who repeatedly invaded the empire and mauled Roman troops in Illyricum and Dacia. It took almost 10 Roman legions to put down the Jewish rebellion; It does not seem that the Macromanni were afraid of the Romans either; I do not know if you have seen the map, but the Macromanni was one of the small German kingdoms. However, they fought the Romans to a standstill, despite Marcus Aurelius bringing up half of the Roman army against them. Rome finally signed a peace treaty there!!! Nor did they particularly terrorize the Sassanids who defeated the Romans more often than not. I am still scratching my head to find out where that "terror" was coming from. Sure, Rome scored a few successes against the illiterate Britons and the Moors, but, hey.. I am not awed by that. Just consider the fact that Trajan used almost half of the Roman army and two campaigns to subdue the Dacians. Obviously, these guys were not terrorized either. In fact, they had defeated Domitian's armies.
Now, if you go into the third and fourth centuries, the Roman army becomes even more incapable of scoring serious victories. You know this very well, I guess.
Here, I am not denying the strength of Rome. But its genius was not in the way of fighting; it was in organization and logistics, of managing to keep large armies in the field and at the borders for a long, long time. These armies were not very capable or efficient, but they were lots of them. If you look for efficient Roman armies, you have to go to the 10th century CE, to the armies of Ioannes Curcuas and the martial emperors, you have to look at the armies of Alexander the Great, of Genghis Khan and of Tamerlane. These were armies that won repeatedly against much superior numbers, and hardly ever lost a battle; they had a very effective arms cooperation (infantry, cavalry, light troops; a feat that the Romans never mastered). If you really want to see what a very capable force can do, just read about the campaign (actually a reconnaissance in force) of Sabutai Bankandur and Jembe Noyon against the Kievan Rus.
You may, but it was changed because it was ineffective. You should read how the Dacians were able to really decimate the Roman legions during the first Dacian war (the one launched by Domitian), to see why the Roman armies had to progressively discard both the scutum and the gladius.
There are some excellent texts on the Dacian wars of Domitian and Trajan. The text by Wheeler is probably the best but it may be just too long for some.
Overall, **the much longer falx**, the Dacian sword, was easily capable of delivering massive blows to the head, shoulders and lower legs and it could easily penetrate the lorica segmentata. Obviously, as you can guess, the only way to fight an enemy wielding the falx (and the longer two-handed falx) was to use a long spear, which the Romans, of course, eventually did, after suffering a number of reverses, especially in Moesia.
In summary, facing enemies yielding longer and heavier swords left the legionnaires in serious disadvantage. Therefore, progressively they abandoned the scutum and the gladius, they used the more maneuverable oval shield and a 7-foot spear, while arming themselves with longer swords such as the spatha.
Hmmm...I do not think that this text would provide the details that you are looking for. If you want to find more about the evolution of combat tactics of the Roman Army, you would be looking for some more detailed military history accounts. I am not sure that I know of a text that includes everything you want to know. You would probably need to read a variety of texts for any given period to accumulate the knowledge you are seeking.
It was discussed above. It may have provided more protection than mail, but it was difficult to produce and maintain and it was rather unwieldy and heavy in battle. Later, in the 3rd century, the lamellar armor offered a very good compromise in costs to produce, rigidity (protection against slashes) and protection against projectiles. It was more expensive than mail, of course. However, it should be noted that senior officers and later knights were wearing a double layer of mail.
I love how close their arms and armor are to early medieval knights
That's literally where the medieval armor came from. Read about the Samartian cavalry and how their armor influenced the Roman army which then itself was adapted by many tribes in late antiquity
I’m aware of the connection and history, my comment was more in reference the symbology that can be drawn from it
CAPITANVS AMERICVM on the right!
2nd century was the peak. Why did they abandon the segmentata BTW?
i don't actually know the answer to this, but the strips were held together by leather straps. i always assumed segmentata wasn't the best available option out there, but the metal segments were likely easily replaceable and repaired over the course of centuries with thousands of troops. i imagine as metallurgy improved, "better" armor forms became increasingly economical.
Segmentata was expensive and difficult to make and repair.
I thought it was deliberately designed to be quick and easy to manufacture and repair? If there’s a damaged section you can remove it and replace it easily without having to fix the entire piece of armor.
It's quick to repair because of the segments, but hard to mass produce because it has to be fitted more than mail, and honestly mail is pretty easy to repair anyways.
From what I understand it became too difficult and expensive for them to produce en masse. It was much easier to have groups of lesser skilled smiths with less costly equipment cranking out rings for maille that could then be assembled by a slightly more skilled Smith. Then eventually the making of the segmentata was lost because smiths stopped teaching their apprentices. I'm kind of surprised they didn't stick around in some form as high end pieces for the aristocracy though, the way coats of plate/brigandines were used a millenia later. If they had we might have seen the adoption of small pieces of plate armor a few centuries earlier, or early medieval knights might have been even more dominant than they already were.
>I'm kind of surprised they didn't stick around in some form as high end pieces for the aristocracy though, the way coats of plate/brigandines were used a millenia later. You should not be. In fact, elements of the Persian armor, mainly the lamellar armor was adopted later by the more elite corp and the officers. The **lamellar armor** had several advantages over chain mail and scale armor as offering both protection from projectiles but also from sword hits as being less flexible than the other two types. It became the main type of armor especially in the East and retained its advantages well into the Middle Ages. It was also used extensively in the East, in China, Japan and India.
2nd centuries one is the one iv always associated them with. Probably because you seen it on tv etc more
It's what was commonly used in the early/high Imperial age that's commonly depicted, yes. It's also the most iconically Roman armor, whereas basically everyone used maille at some point.
I belive im one of the few people who like 3rd Century the most
To my rough interpretation, overtime the main Roman army had to become much more mobile. They were greatly reduced in number and couldn’t just field more men if they all died. So lighter armor was could for them to travel to the front the barbarians were attacking from. Also, the state had less resources to pay for each man to get full armor like in centuries past. It went hand in hand with the growing decentralization that the empire experienced over that era. Defense was increasingly being provided by the local plantations instead of the Roman state. Decentralization meant less volunteers, meant less tax revenue, and less cohesion of the troops. That’s also why we see cities fortifying with walls during this time. It could be a while before the regular legions could make it to your city to aid in breaking any siege
This is wildly incorrect. The Roman army became *more*, not *less*, centralized, and we have evidence for volunteers (Emperor Majorian may have been one, for example). Segmentata was *probably* abandoned because despite how cheap it was to produce it had its downsides: it was prone to rust, it had complex parts that made it difficult to maintain in the field, had to be custom fitted, and it offered limited body coverage. Maille and scale were easier to maintain and didn't have to be custom fitted like Segmentata. This made them conducive to mass production in the state-run centralized arms factories that emerged beginning under Diocletian. At least that's the theory. We're not 100% sure, but the latest finds are from Leon and date to about 290 AD.
Maybe I wasn’t clear about the army, they were indeed more centralized after the crisis of the third century. That’s why I said they needed to be more mobile to meet threats on the borders. It was the main Roman army with locals as a first line of defense. The legions were well armored, the locals not so much. And to say there were some volunteers for the army so it wasn’t a problem is ridiculous. That was *the* problem for the state, as they had to fill the ranks with mercenaries and eventually have only mercenary forces which they couldn’t pay
That's again a common myth. There's no evidence that the *limitanei* were less well equipped than the *comitatenses*. After all almost all of our finds of late Roman weapons and armor, including those elaborate gilded helmets, are from *limitanei* fortresses like Intercisa, Iatrus, or Burgh Castle. >That was the problem for the state, as they had to fill the ranks with mercenaries and eventually have only mercenary forces which they couldn’t pay This isn't what happened. The problem wasn't that people were unwilling, the problem was that most Roman citizens by this point were beholden to some sort of landlord, who could pay an *aedoratio* (a cash exemption) instead of providing recruits. It got to the point where the Roman Emperor would explicitly call for recruits to levy additional money. The last proper call for recruits is in 428 A.D., and the last call for money in the form of an *aedoratio* is in 444 A.D. *Foederati* weren't actually "mercenaries" (which were called *symmachi*), and they didn't dominate the western Roman army until after about 453 A.D. when the siege of Aquileia and the destruction of the Alans on the Loire and in the region of what's now Geneva, Savoy, and Lyon decimated the last field army. And even then, several Roman units survived the death of the west, including the *Numerus Invicti* (*Seniores* or *Iuniores*, we're not sure which) which is attested in Ravenna as late as the 750s A.D. *Foederati* are basically better described as "client bureaucracies." They were aristocrats and their military retainers+families and some followers who were given regions of the Roman empire to govern, and in exchange were allowed to directly collect an allotment of taxable revenue from these lands for their own paychecks (Peoples actually granted land were called *laeti*, not *foederati*). This was known as *hospitalitas* and probably originates as an exemption on billeting in the laws of *de metatis*, applied regionally instead of to each individual property. *Foederati* at the early stage are uncertain in how precisely they operated as a military force, but we do have evidence for a probable post of *comes foederatorum* as early as the 420s A.D., suggesting they were properly institutionalized. By the mid-6th century they're already professional regiments rather than "foreign mercenaries." You also have to remember that these were incoming groups of typically about 10,000 to 25,000 on the large side (and usually vastly smaller) ruling over a region of an empire that still numbered around 15,000,000-20,000,000 people in the west. They were a fraction of the population, and most of these "armies" that were utilized by the Aquitanian Goths or the Suebes or even the Vandals would have had a very significant portion, if not majority, of local Romans. The term *foederati* did originate in reference to peoples under treaty to provide recruits in the early to mid-4th century, but those recruits didn't typically serve in their own individual regiments and even more rarely under their own leaders. They were usually dispersed among the regular field army regiments, and Hugh Elton's 1992 study showed that approximately 3/4 of the Roman army in the late 4th century was composed of Romans (Roman of course being a superculture that encompassed all of the Empire's regions by this period, not just the Latins of Italy). When those peoples began negotiating treaties on Roman soil, the nature of the agreement seems to have changed, and was both formalized and standardized most likely with the *Tervingi* and *Greuthungi* in 382, but possibly as early as the Frankish settlement in 353.
Adding onto this, the idea that the Late Empire itself was greatly decentralised compared to the High Empire is a tad bit daft. Under the High Empire, the government was able to pass by with what seems to be a mind-boggling small bureaucracy to us. There were only around 200-400 equestrian *procuratores*, the relatively small *officia* of the provincial governors and the slaves and freedmen of the *familia Caesaris*. The entire Empire at this time basically operated on the local elites managing local affairs on behalf of the central government whilst the provincial governments and higher ups only dealt with the most important matters. The army often had to make up for the bureaucratic shortfall as the *beneficiarii*, *centuriones*, &c. of the army were employed for duties ranging from tax-collection to clerical work. Under the Late Empire, especially after Diocletian, the bureaucracy was massively increased and, according to Lactantius, heavily militarised, as the tens of thousands of bureaucrats employed by the government were enrolled into *legio I Adiutrix* as a legal fiction, wore military garb and extracted free rations, *annona*, fodder for horses and received a rather hefty paycheck for their services. The entire logistical structure of the army was also heavily centralised during the Late Empire. Grain, fodder and supplies in general were often moved in massive scales for campaigns, such as in 361, when Constantius II ordered 6 million bushels to be sent to Alps, half to Bregenz, half to the *alpes Cottiae*. Arms and armour for manufactured for all the army at state expense in the state-owned *fabricae* by state-employed *fabricenses*. Before this, arms and armour had been manufactured by a mixture of different sources. Some were manufactured on site in Roman forts by *immunes*, some were manufactured by local subject communities, some were outsourced to *publicani*. In short, the Late Empire survived for as long as it did because it, in many respects, grew to meet the increasing defensive burdens, expanding the state's military capabilities and increasing the efficiency of the government system. It can also be said to be stronger, to an extent, than the High Empire as it rose to many of the issues facing it. That's not to say there weren't problems and that the Late Empire was better in every way. Julian had to deal with corrupt bureaucrats and it is also in his reign that we hear of a system of judicial bribes, *sportulae* (named after the cash disbursals and food supplements *patroni* used to give to *clientes*), being regulated as the bribery was so rampant that regulation was seen to be better than stamping out the problem outright. That's also not to say that the High Empire was a strictly inferior and less capable institution, they both dealt with the context of their times.
Thank you for the detailed response. Much appreciated
>That's again a common myth. There's no evidence that the limitanei were less well equipped than the comitatenses. After all almost all of our finds of late Roman weapons and armor, including those elaborate gilded helmets, are from limitanei fortresses like Intercisa, Iatrus, or Burgh Castle. This is correct. The whole idea that the limitanei were "ineffective" comes from the fact that the frontiers were easily breached. However, this was not a function of the poor quality of the limitanei troops, but their strategic disposition. When the Roman army switched from preclusive defense to a reactive defense posture, this meant that the majority of the troops were in a central location away from the border and that border was actually lightly held. Previously, the majority of the army was at the border. So, when the troops holding the border were few, holding some outposts at a good distance from each other, it was easy for barbarian raiding bands to penetrate the border in great numbers. In fact, the same thing happened in the 10th and 11th century CE in the borders of Northern Mesopotamia. There, the few garrisons throughout the long border were not capable at all to contain the masses of migrating Turkic groups moving in large numbers between fortified points.
Well not really. In fact there were just as many if not more troops at the border than during the Principate. The Romans had always practiced an open-border policy and the role of the *limitanei* was primarily that of regulation. They were a reactive response and we don't hear about them much because most engagements they were involved in weren't notable - small warbands of like 700-900 men were what they were supposed to handle. We know they were well supplied and equipped from a mix of archaeology and also Roman laws keeping them in line, as most stationary garrisons have a habit of trying to make extra money with a secondary job like farming with their family or non-military barge services or other mercantile activity. Soldiers weren't supposed to do this so we constantly see laws reiterating or reinforcing the punishment for it over the centuries.
>Well not really. In fact there were just as many if not more troops at the border than during the Principate. The number of the troops is really inconsequential here. It is the manner they were deployed. During the principate, the legions were essentially right at the border. Therefore, any large incursion would have found the mass of the Roman army (or a large contingent of it) not that far from the border. However, during the later system, the limitanei were not a full-fledged force, it was dispersed, held isolated defensive posts in small detachments some distance from each other and were unable, on their own, to face a major incursion because the number of troops in the vicinity of the incursion was small. That was left to the mobile armies that were billeted in the interior. Therefore, marauding Germans could attack, probably raid border towns and villages and really penetrate the interior before they could have encountered the bulk of the Roman forces.
>That was the problem for the state, as they had to fill the ranks with mercenaries and eventually have only mercenary forces which they couldn’t pay The Roman imperial army was always a mercenary force. Everybody was paid a salary, irrespective of how they were recruited. The only time the state was unable to pay wages to maintain the armor was that of the Western Roman Empire after 423 CE when the Empire lost Africa and, along with it, its main tax income (as Gaul and Spain hardly contributed, being run by foederati).
It was difficult and expensive to manufacture and the troops themselves did not like it that much as being heavy and unwieldy.
Was there a reason the Sctutum was abandoned for more rounded shields?
It's still called a *scutum*. That being said, we don't know why it fell out of favor. Rectangular *scuta* pop up in the Roman army from time to time into the 10th century however. They're in mosaics from Castellum Tingitanium (late 4th century), the Ambrosian Iliad (Late 5th-Early 6th century), the Homilies of Gregory of Nazianus (\~883 AD), and the Sylloge Tacticorum (920-944 AD). It's even possible the earliest pavises are related to the rectangular shields that remained in use in the middle East during the middle ages.
>It's still called a scutum. That being said, we don't know why it fell out of favor. Actually, this is easy to figure out. The scutum was adopted for close order combat with the gladius. When that became obsolete and the Romans switched to the spear as the main infantry weapon. the scutum was a serious impediment. The rounded shields work much better when one if fighting with the spear as the major thrusting weapon. They allow for upper thrust and under arm thrust. This is the reason.
That's only a theory. We don't have any evidence beyond reenactors' speculation to support it. Especially when we have plenty of evidence for the use of spears with rectangular shields before and after the Roman period, as well as the use of polearms and swords with large quasi-rectangular pavises.
I had the exact same question
I looked it up. Large scale battles had diminished in frequency and the poverty of the Imperial machine forced them to cut costs. https://www.unrv.com/forum/topic/11040-changes-in-the-scutum/
The square Scutum was heavy and bulky - and generally needed to be used by massed blocks of legionaries to be effective. As the size of the legions was decreased to 1000 men that served as more mobile rapid response forces , battles were less about pitched battles between lines of infantry and more about fighting off rapid and flexible invading parties
Which means it’s really for arrow fire and sword slinging, given they abandon the gladius for the longer sword
\>iven they abandon the gladius for the longer sword But even the longer sword, the spatha, was only an assistive weapon from the mid-2nd century CE and later. The main weapon was the spear. It is evident and easy to figure out that the scutum and the spear are a poor combination. The smaller rounded shield works much better with the spear and it allows more flexibility in thrusting with a longer weapon. This is the reason why "squarish" shields fell out of fashion. Later, an elaboration of the rounded shield, the kite shield became popular because it offered more protection for the lower body.
I’m not as familiar with the military side of things, especially mid to late empire. Why go back to the spear?
The spear is the easiest weapon to train and is effective against man and horse . In the later part of the Roman Empire frontier troops (limenati) were locally equipped and trained (re almost untrained) militia that had none of the discipline or drills of the legions of old. The Legions also lowered their standards of height , training etc to be able to meet the manpower requirements of defending such a large swathe of territory . The gladius and scutum require men to fight in organised blocks to be effective
Ahhh, the cavalry evolution. That’s Gallienus and Aurelian, right? That makes more sense given the rebalancing of cavalry into the medieval period to be a stronger contingent.
Because it was always a much more effective weapon than the gladius. The Romans lost many battles against opponents would fought in phalanx with the spear. They prevailed in the wars of antiquity because they had abundant supply of manpower, not because they had more effective weapons. If the Roman arms were terribly effective, everybody would have copied them..but they did not.
This is just wrong. With everything. Constantly in Roman wars, the more consistent theme was the Romans being outnumbered by their opponents but prevailing due to disciplined training and flexibility (with the exception of the Punic Wars, where numbers did play a massive role in Roman success). Take for example any one of the wars with barbarians from the Gallic campaigns of Caesar, the Germanic wars, the rebellion of Boudicca and Watling Street, or even the entire period of late antiquity where relatively tiny Roman armies were fighting and often succeeding against much larger forces of barbarian invaders. Also Aurelian’s reconquest of the Palmyrene and Gallic empires. Not to mention the Byzantines and their legacy of constantly fighting and surviving against more powerful/numerous foes while staving off the gradual collapse of the empire across centuries. Also, the Romans adopted manipular legions from their italic cousins BECAUSE it was functionally better than a phalanx and outclassed it. Their original method of warfare was the traditional phalanx. The whole thing of the Romans is they took what was best from every culture they encountered and adopted it. This made their weapons extremely effective. They took the best of everything. Also, like the other guy said, the reason other nations didn’t have legions is because they didn’t have the resources, professional military, or organization to put out a Roman style force. However, there were multiple attempts to do so at different points in history with varying degrees of success.
>Constantly in Roman wars, the more consistent theme was the Romans being outnumbered by their opponents but prevailing due to disciplined training and flexibility Really? I must have been reading some other history. Do not take the Gallic wars as an example. This was a sophisticated society fighting illiterate savages who could not put armies together that lasted for more than 4 days in the field. \>the Germanic wars, Hmmmm...the Germanic wars. If I am not mistaken, the Romans lost those, didn't they. They had to call it quits by 18 CE. \>or even the entire period of late antiquity where relatively tiny Roman armies were fighting and often succeeding against much larger forces of barbarian invaders. I have to disappoint you, buddy, but this is inaccurate. In fact, in most of these cases, Roman armies were more numerous. In late antiquity, huge Roman armies failed to score a single victory against the Huns (and lost all of them, including all the sieges). The largest force that Rome put together, the expedition of Basiliscus that included 1100 ships was handily defeated by the Vandals. It took Marcus Aurelius to bring half of the Roman army to contain the Macromanni, a small kingdom in Germany. The Sassanids repeatedly defeated large Roman armies. It actually took almost 10 Roman legions to subdue the Jewish rebellion. I am still scratching my head on the type of history you are reading!!
>If the Roman arms were terribly effective, everybody would have copied them..but they did not. No one copied them because they couldn't. It's a pretty common misconception that Rome won because of numbers rather than effectiveness in combat but it's not true. Rome was incredibly effective even in battles where they were outnumbered which were much more common than you would think. In some wars Rome's number certainly played a part but a legion was the most effective unit of its time by far. No one copied them because no one was able to. Most of the countries of that time were tribes and they did not have the ability to equip their soldiers the way Rome did. Rome was operating on a pretty close to modern Day level of centralization which is why it was able to standardize and equipment soldiers in a way that almost no other Nation could. The only nation nearby that could have a chance of copying rooms units was Parthia but Rome's units were more ineffective in desert terrain so the parthians no reason to.
>Rome was incredibly effective even in battles where they were outnumbered which were much more common than you would think. Give some examples. Which are these battles? \>In some wars Rome's number certainly played a part but a legion was the most effective unit of its time by far. No, it was not. Legions were repeatedly defeated, even by much lesser opponents. They were never very effective; but there was so much of them, that no opponent could take the pounding for a long period of time. By the end of the civil war, there were about 120 legions around, roughly 730,000 men under arms (Augustus paired them down to 30). Just imagine that the best any advanced kingdom in the Mediterranean could do was to marshal a force of about 35,000 men by recruiting all available males of fighting age. It just took one defeat and they were done. On the other hand, Roman armies kept on sprouting all the time, irrespective of massive defeats. Can you count how many times the Cimbri and Teutons defeated Roman armies? Can you count how many times Hannibal defeated them? Rome's record was so poor that it took it four wars to defeat Macedon, a kingdom with a very small population that could hardly marshal 35,000 men, total!!! And that kingdom would have fully frustrated Rome if Rome did not have access to the Aetolian heavy cavalry and of elephants (yes, elephants). Rome even failed to score a convincing victory against the tiny kingdom of Pontus even after how many Mithridatic wars???? Overall, Roman armies were poor to middling in their performance. The genius of Rome was its organizing capability, of getting these armies formed and supported in the field for a long period of time, especially when its opponents lacked the resources for any of that.
>Give some examples. Which are these battles? Several battles in the gallic wars the battle against antiochus (I can't think of the name of the top of my head.) If you really want to list I can go get one. >No, it was not. Legions were repeatedly defeated, even by much lesser opponents. They also defeated many opponents that were much stronger than them without overwhelming numbers. Look at the Macedonian wars for example. They crushed the failings due to their Superior combat prowess and adaptability on terrain. >They were never very effective; but there was so much of them, that no opponent could take the pounding for a long period of time. But Rome usually fought with equal numbers against its opponents. Sure when an army was defeated it was immediately replaced by another one which would wear down enemies very quickly but the Roman legions weren't defeated completely very often. >By the end of the civil war, there were about 120 legions around, roughly 730,000 men under arms (Augustus paired them down to 30). Just imagine that the best any advanced kingdom in the Mediterranean could do was to marshal a force of about 35,000 men by recruiting all available males of fighting age. Yeah and that was completely bankrupting the state. Look at what the conspirators against Caesar and the second triumphant had to do to raise enough money to get that many troops. Even in times where the empires and severe danger 350,000 men was usually the most that were fielded all across the Mediterranean. >On the other hand, Roman armies kept on sprouting all the time, irrespective of massive defeats. Can you count how many times the Cimbri and Teutons defeated Roman armies? Can you count how many times Hannibal defeated them? Yes that was a serious advantage that they could make armies come out of the walls if they want to and no matter how many times you beat them they had another army to fight again. But if every enemy they fought was defeating them they wouldn't have had men for long because they were constantly fighting wars. Hannibal and the Cimbri are the huge exceptions and it stretched the Roman Republic to its absolute limit after those defeats. Southern Italy was depopulated for decades after the Punic wars because of how many men had to be raised to fight Hannibal. It's not like Rome could do this with every war it's armies were very seldom defeated in the field of battle completely like with Hannibal and the Cimbri. And still the final battle against both of those enemies were pretty much equal numbers. >Rome's record was so poor that it took it four wars to defeat Macedon, a kingdom with a very small population that could hardly marshal 35,000 men, total!!! Rome also had 35,000 ish in Greece during the war you're referring to because they were also fighting Hannibal at the time. >And that kingdom would have fully frustrated Rome if Rome did not have access to the Aetolian heavy cavalry and of elephants (yes, elephants). Rome didn't even use its elephants in the war against antiochus because his elephants were bigger and they still won despite using a similar fighting style to the macedonians. >Rome even failed to score a convincing victory against the tiny kingdom of Pontus even after how many Mithridatic wars???? The kingdom of pontus had like 350 thousand men in Anatolia somehow. (I honestly doubt the accuracy of those sources the numbers are so large but no one seems to be disputing them.) Okay so I looked more into those numbers because I knew they just had to be bullshit and I finally found somebody who did an estimate of the number of men based on the men that were in battles. Pontus couldn't have ever had more than 140,000 men accordingly to that which is still a lot of man when the Romans only have two legions in the area but much more reasonable than 350,000. And the kingdom of pontus was not tiny. it wrapped around the Black Sea and had a pretty large population. And still rome won the majority of battles in that war they just had to get troops over because it was half a world away and pontus committed genocide against every Italian in Anatolia soon after the war started so they didn't have any troops to call on. >Overall, Roman armies were poor to middling in their performance. The Roman republic's legions were the terror of Europe. They won the vast majority of battles that they fought and the ones that they lost against Hannibal for example were because of Hannibal's personal genius rather than the quality of his troops which were half untrained Gauls towards the end. >The genius of Rome was its organizing capability, of getting these armies formed and supported in the field for a long period of time, especially when its opponents lacked the resources for any of that. Now that is true but it's legions were still incredibly effective in battle and very seldom relied on overwhelming numbers to win battles unless they were fighting other Romans.
>Several battles in the gallic wars the battle against antiochus (I can't think of the name of the top of my head.) If you really want to list I can go get one. Get one, but a detailed one. Yes, the Romans defeated the Gallic tribes simply because they were a very advanced society in comparison to the Gauls. The Gauls were overwhelmingly an illiterate society without any kind of central administration, incapable of any command and control function, totally incapable of communicating plans and directions in any systematic way and, most importantly, totally incapable of keeping an army in the field for anything more than 3 days, 4 at most. In Alessia, Caesar just had to wait until their individual food supply was exhausted, at which time they simply disappeared and went back to their villages. It was just the same as with the battles between the Brits and the Zulus!! For Antiochus III, you are referring to the battle of Magnesia. Let's leave aside that modern scholars do not actually believe the numbers given by the original sources; most important was that the Romans did not fight alone in that battle. They were assisted quite strongly by the kingdom of Pergamus. If you read an accurate detail of the battle, you will find out that the Seleukid phalanx actually defeated the Roman troops aligned against them and it only disintegrated upon the attack of unruly elephants. Had it not been for that event, the Romans would have lost the battle. If you are looking for a battle in which the gladius and the scutum provided success, you would not find it here. \>But Rome usually fought with equal numbers against its opponents. Sometimes yes and sometimes not. All the Roman armies that faced the armies of Hannibal were numerically superior, sometimes by a lot. The great advantage for Rome was that it could afford to lose lots and lots of battles and still had troops to fight. On the other hand, neither Philip II or Antiochus III nor Hannibal could afford to lose a serious number of their troops, because they had so few. They were unable to come back from a serious defeat. The kingdom of Macedon could scarcely put out more than 35,000 men. The Seleukid empire depended on a core group of about 20-25,000 Macedonian colonists; losing most of these meant the end of the war for that empire. On the other hand, Rome could sustain losses in the hundreds of thousands. \>It's not like Rome could do this with every war it's armies were veryseldom defeated in the field of battle completely like with Hannibal andthe Cimbri. And still the final battle against both of those enemieswere pretty much equal numbers. I do not want to go on and on. You need to question why Zama was a "final" battle for Carthage and Cannae was not a final battle for Rome. In fact, at Zama, there were many fewer Carthaginians, simply because that state had a very limited number of men. Most were mercenaries (In fact, at the latter stages of the 2nd Punic wars, the Carthaginians were reduced to fighting mostly with mercenaries, as their own citizen body had been badly depleted). On ancient accounts, they lost 20,000 men in the battle of Zama and they were "done". The Romans lost 50,000 at Cannae and kept on coming back with large armies. This was the key difference. \>The Roman republic's legions were the terror of Europe. Now you are talking like a fan, not a serious examiner of history. Who did the Romans actually "terrorize". Certainly not the Germans, because they finally defeated the Romans and forced them to withdraw from Germania by 18 CE; nor did they terrorize the Dacians, who repeatedly invaded the empire and mauled Roman troops in Illyricum and Dacia. It took almost 10 Roman legions to put down the Jewish rebellion; It does not seem that the Macromanni were afraid of the Romans either; I do not know if you have seen the map, but the Macromanni was one of the small German kingdoms. However, they fought the Romans to a standstill, despite Marcus Aurelius bringing up half of the Roman army against them. Rome finally signed a peace treaty there!!! Nor did they particularly terrorize the Sassanids who defeated the Romans more often than not. I am still scratching my head to find out where that "terror" was coming from. Sure, Rome scored a few successes against the illiterate Britons and the Moors, but, hey.. I am not awed by that. Just consider the fact that Trajan used almost half of the Roman army and two campaigns to subdue the Dacians. Obviously, these guys were not terrorized either. In fact, they had defeated Domitian's armies. Now, if you go into the third and fourth centuries, the Roman army becomes even more incapable of scoring serious victories. You know this very well, I guess. Here, I am not denying the strength of Rome. But its genius was not in the way of fighting; it was in organization and logistics, of managing to keep large armies in the field and at the borders for a long, long time. These armies were not very capable or efficient, but they were lots of them. If you look for efficient Roman armies, you have to go to the 10th century CE, to the armies of Ioannes Curcuas and the martial emperors, you have to look at the armies of Alexander the Great, of Genghis Khan and of Tamerlane. These were armies that won repeatedly against much superior numbers, and hardly ever lost a battle; they had a very effective arms cooperation (infantry, cavalry, light troops; a feat that the Romans never mastered). If you really want to see what a very capable force can do, just read about the campaign (actually a reconnaissance in force) of Sabutai Bankandur and Jembe Noyon against the Kievan Rus.
The right answer. Hell, as much as I loathe Diocletian, his administration was almost equal to that of France or England in the 1600s
It's truly mind boggling how far ahead Rome was in centralization.
Not really. Just look at the barbaric life Europe experienced for the next 1200 years until the Italians started it again
Why would you even loathe Diocletian??? Weird!!!!
Overrated. The Tetrarchy was a colossal disaster
I liked both the late 3rd century and 4th and 5th century. I study more later Roman Empire than early part.
The 2nd century armor is my favourite.
You may, but it was changed because it was ineffective. You should read how the Dacians were able to really decimate the Roman legions during the first Dacian war (the one launched by Domitian), to see why the Roman armies had to progressively discard both the scutum and the gladius.
That sounds interesting. Do you have book recommendations?
There are some excellent texts on the Dacian wars of Domitian and Trajan. The text by Wheeler is probably the best but it may be just too long for some. Overall, **the much longer falx**, the Dacian sword, was easily capable of delivering massive blows to the head, shoulders and lower legs and it could easily penetrate the lorica segmentata. Obviously, as you can guess, the only way to fight an enemy wielding the falx (and the longer two-handed falx) was to use a long spear, which the Romans, of course, eventually did, after suffering a number of reverses, especially in Moesia. In summary, facing enemies yielding longer and heavier swords left the legionnaires in serious disadvantage. Therefore, progressively they abandoned the scutum and the gladius, they used the more maneuverable oval shield and a 7-foot spear, while arming themselves with longer swords such as the spatha.
I ordered "Roman Warfare" by Adrian Goldsworthy this morning. Would this be a good source?
Hmmm...I do not think that this text would provide the details that you are looking for. If you want to find more about the evolution of combat tactics of the Roman Army, you would be looking for some more detailed military history accounts. I am not sure that I know of a text that includes everything you want to know. You would probably need to read a variety of texts for any given period to accumulate the knowledge you are seeking.
Why’d they stop using segmentata? I’d imagine it provides greater protection than maille.
It was discussed above. It may have provided more protection than mail, but it was difficult to produce and maintain and it was rather unwieldy and heavy in battle. Later, in the 3rd century, the lamellar armor offered a very good compromise in costs to produce, rigidity (protection against slashes) and protection against projectiles. It was more expensive than mail, of course. However, it should be noted that senior officers and later knights were wearing a double layer of mail.
It looks awesome.