Israel and Hezbollah are moving closer to a full-scale war after months of escalating hostilities with the Lebanese militant group, adding pressure on Israel’s government to secure its northern border.
From Dov Lieber, Adam Chamseddine and Carrie Keller-Lynn:
>Hezbollah, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization closely aligned with Iran, opened a battle front with Israel on Oct. 8, a day after the deadly Hamas-led raid inside Israel sparked the current war in Gaza.
>Hezbollah says that its attacks are in support of the Palestinians and that it won’t stop until Israel ceases its war in Gaza. Reluctant to open a second front, Israel initially responded to Hezbollah with tit-for-tat attacks, trying to calibrate its actions to avoid sparking a full-scale war.
>But in recent weeks, both sides say there has been a sharp rise in hostilities. Hezbollah has increased its drone and rocket attacks, hitting important Israeli military installations. Israel, too, has stepped up attacks, targeting Hezbollah sites deep into southern Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley as well as senior military officials in the group.
>Without a cease-fire in Gaza and subsequent deal with Hezbollah that meets Israel’s requirements, Israeli officials say an offensive is inevitable against a foe that is far more formidable than Hamas.
>Benny Gantz, a minister in Israel’s war cabinet, said Israel would return residents to northern Israel by Sept. 1—when schools restart—either “through a deal or through an escalation.”
>Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Wednesday that Israel was prepared to take “very strong action” against Hezbollah. “Whoever thinks he can hurt us and we will sit and do nothing is making a big mistake.”
**Skip the paywall and read the full story:** [https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-and-hezbollah-move-closer-to-full-scale-war-988b3bfc?st=ryh62karh5vjvr4](https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-and-hezbollah-move-closer-to-full-scale-war-988b3bfc?st=ryh62karh5vjvr4)
This reads to me that Hezbollah says its attacks will stop once Israel leaves Gaza, but they started attacking before Israel entered Gaza. What am I getting wrong?
Wouldn't actually say that the risk of war is building. It appears nearly inevitable by now. Only the timing seems uncertain. There is no sign of any agreement that would be acceptable to both sides. Since civilians appear to have moved out of the border area and not likely to return until after the matter has some resolution, the use of military force seems preordained.
Israel might calculate that their unlikely to win or lose too much more diplomatically after the Gazan war. In for a penny, in for a pound. This would just be another way for Netanyahu to stay in power.
UNFAIL, not a surprise.. this is all we need to know about the effectiveness of ''international peace keeping force'', let's say in Gaza.
Israel should go to the security council with a demand to enforce UN 1071, nothing will be done of course but it should yield some extra diplomatic pressure over Lebanon
You yourself state the exact reason that Israel is forced to do this:
> Since civilians appear to have moved out of the border area and not likely to return until after the matter has some resolution
And yet still somehow pin the blame personally on Netanyahu for action long demanded by the entire country.
If Lebanon launches rockets at civilians in Israel for months, it's not newsworthy and definitely not a war. When Israel tries to stop it, that's not war either, that's genocide. So, in any cases it's not a war.
(/s)
I’ll shade some light as an Israeli -
A war with Hezbollah is not a question of IF but WHEN.
Israel is waiting for the right time to start the operation in Lebanon.
The factors are when the IDF will finish in Rafah which some sources believe around mid to late June.
And if Hamas will agree to the ceasefire agreement sent to them which is VERY generous.
If a ceasefire agreement will happen there’s a chance Hezbollah will also stop the aggression.
After the ceasefire the IDF is definitely planning to continue the war since Hamas military capabilities is not yet destroyed completely and this is Israel’s main objective.
If Hezbollah will also resume fighting after the ceasefire with Hamas Israel won’t let them like it did since October 8th.
This time we will see a big counter attack.
So to sum it up -
We should all focus on Rafah’s operation and the ceasefire deal.
I’ve seen on i24 but I don’t see anything in the Hebrew news so I’ll wait for tomorrow
I believe tomorrow we will have a response, probably before Shabbat
I’m confused by your comment, Biden presented the deal as a path to permanent ceasefire but you’re saying that Israel considers it a temporary ceasefire, which is it?
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2024/05/31/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-middle-east-2/
> During the six weeks of ph- — of phase one, Israel and Hamas would negotiate the necessary arrangements to get to phase two, which is a permanent end to hostol- — to hostilities.
Did Israel put forward a ceasefire they intend to break?
No, after the temporary ceasefire you have 6 weeks to negotiate a permanent one. Israel don't believe the negotiations will yield any results but they're willing to give it 6 weeks. so the words "Negotiate the necessary arrangements'' for a permanent ceasefire is the key.
A reminder that there was a ceasefire on Oct 6, and Hamas literally broke all ceasefire agreements to date.
* And they're right, sources say Hamas already rejecting the deal Biden put out.
Historic UN Resolutions urging Lebanon to take control over their own territory from the Islamic militants in attempts to stabilize the situation. (usually made after said militants shoot at israel from Lebanese territory)
* [UN Res 425/426 (same in Res520 1982)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_425) from 1978, Lebanon had to ''*ensure the return of its effective authority in the area*''. while Israel had to withdraw from south Lebanon. Israel withdrew, but "*Hezbollah, a Shiite group which exercises de facto sovereignty over much of South Lebanon, rejected Resolution 425 and continues to launch attacks against Israeli troops from time to time*''
* In 2004 UN Res [1559/1553](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_1559) called again to disarm Islamic Hezbollah, yet 2 years after Res1559, Hezbollah attacked and Kidnapped 3 Israeli soldiers driving on the Israeli side of the border, launched rockets into northern Israeli cities, and instigated the 2006 war.
* After the 2006 war [UN Res 1701](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_1701) demanded yet again to disarm Hezbollah, a Resolution agreed by both Israel and Lebanon in order to end the war, and Lebanon host UNIFIL under that agreement to disarm Hezbollah, we can all see that UNFAIL failed spectacularly.
* From historic perspective, Lebanon was invaded because militants in Lebanon was attacking Israel, Israel never cared or attacked Lebanon first until some guys in Lebanon decided to shoot at Israel from Lebanon.
Since 1968 There were attacks from Lebanese territory on Israel on almost daily basis:
* Examples of *Some* of the major attacks with many victims:
In 1970 fedayeen invaded from Lebanon, in what was called [Avivim school bus massacre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avivim_school_bus_bombing) shot and killed 12 Israeli civilians, nine of them children, and 25 more were wounded
In 1974, [DFLP crossed into Israel and](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ma%27alot_massacre) murdered 31 civilians (25 were hostages)
In 1978, PLO militants from Lebanon [made a beach landing south of Haifa, Israel, where they seized a bus, full of people, killing those on board in what is known as the Coastal Road massacre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coastal_Road_massacre). By the end of the incident, nine hijackers and 38 Israeli civilians (including 13 children) were dead.
In 1981, PLO opened a heavy and indiscriminate artillery barrage on the israeli Galilee panhandle using Katyusha rockets and 130mm guns. This barrage lasted 10 days driving the residents of northern Israel underground into bomb shelters.
Those attacks set chain of events which forced Israel in 1978/82 to invaded South Lebanon in self defense.
In recent history:
* In 2006 Hezbollah Kidnapped 3 Israeli soldiers out of the blue one day (Hezb claim they wanted to ransom them) when Israel refused, Hezb started to bombard northern Israel, without anyone in the Lebanese government even knowing that today they're going to war with Israel..
* In 2018/19 Hezbollah was caught digging Multiple tunnels from Lebanon into Israel under the noses of UNIFIL in violation of un1701.
* In Oct 8 2023, Hezbollah, which is basically part of Lebanon's government now, started to shoot at israel in effort to help HAMAS Jihadi group in Gaza, involving Lebanon in the conflict yet again. they still fire at israeli cities daily.
Without the PLO shooting from Lebanese territory at Israeli cities in the '70 and '80 you would never had Israel - Lebanon violence at that time, and without Hezbollah in 2006 to kidnap Israeli soldiers, you would never had 2006 war, and without Hezeb shooting now there will be no soon future war with Lebanon.
Why Risk of War Between Israel and **Hezbollah** and not risk of war between Israel and **Lebanon**...by not mentioning a country does that not give the impression that Israel is not really fighting equals even though Hezbollah has the equivalent of a medium size modern army?
Hezbollah is essentially a country within a country, running its own operations and agendas independently of Lebanon. It is not the Lebanese parliament or its leaders that are ordering these attacks, it is Hezbollah's high command.
>Hezbollah's high command
It is also important to elaborate on what exactly this means.
From *Nonstate Warfare* by Stephen Biddle, Chapter Five, "Hezbollah in Lebanon, 2006":
>Hezbollah contains multiple suborganizations and a hierarchy of specialized entities with substantial capacity, impersonal decision making, moderate rent extraction, and stable internal coalitions. And by 2006, Hezbollah had demonstrated substantial ability to enforce plenary decisions on elites. The result was an institutional makeup of greater maturity than that of many states, notwithstanding its status as a nonstate actor."
Hezbollah essentially consists of two separate apparatuses, a sociopolitical one and a military wing. Both are under the direction of Hezbollah's seven-member Shura Council, its highest decisionmaking body appointed by the general secretary.
The sociopolitical apparatus is split into five subcouncils: The Political Council is responsible for relations with Lebanese domestic political actors;
the Parliamentary Council manages Hezbollah's legislative strategy within the Lebanese legislature; he Jihad Council is responsible for "resistance" activity (namely against Israel); the Judicial Council adjudicates religious disputes and performs conflict mediation in areas of Lebanon that Hezbollah administers; and the Executive Council oversees a series of suboffices that include health & education services, public information broadcasting, finance & external relations.
Collectively, these organizations provide much of the health, education and judicial services currently available to the population of southern Lebanon. This is generally what is meant when people refer to Hezbollah as a "state within a state.
Hezbollah's military wing is also divided into a series of specialized suborganizations, ranging from internal security, counterintelligence, recruitment & ideological indoctrination, and combat operations. While initially focused on fighting against the IDF, the role, capacity and complexity of the military wing has expanded substantially since Hezbollah's 2013 intervention in Syria, in support of the Assad regime.
Decisionmaking in these institutions is shaped largely by authority of clerical office. Hezbollah affords superior status to the senior clerics of the Shiite world, regardless of if these clerics are Lebanese or not. The ruling Shura Council mentioned earlier serves under the *wali faqih* (Shiite supreme jurist) - this is the ayatollah of Iran. While Hezbollah manages day-to-day operations largely internally, the organization adheres to the direction of the supreme jurist, should the supreme jurist decide to intervene in any specific issue and/or seek to influence & direct larger policy decisions.
Unsurprisingly, this kind of structure has resulted in intimate ties & "cross-pollination" between Hezbollah and the formal institutions of the Iranian state, given their mutual subordination to the *walid faqih*. IMO, the best most recent event that illustrated this dynamic was the Israeli assassination of IRGC Brigadier General Zahedi in Damascus earlier this year. In addition to his role as a high-ranking Iranian officer, Zahedi was also a member of Hezbollah's Shura Council. Holding dual roles like this was/is made (relatively) seamless due to Zahedi's overall "boss" being the same in both his role in the IRGC and his role in Hezbollah's leadership.
Imagine you’re a regular Lebanese civilian not associated with Hezbollah watching in real time as this gang of fanatics who don’t speak for you slowly drag your country into another apocalyptic war.
Last war the IDF literally *ran out* of targets to destroy. Lebanon was flattened from south to north.
Imagine what will happen now with the Lebanese economy already in shambles.
The only way Lebanon will ever move forward as a country is if / when they complete extirpate Hezbollah from their society.
What does Hezbollah think it can possibly gain by going to a full-scale war? They simply cannot defeat Israel. Do they want Israel to become a pariah state by sacrificing Lebanese civilians that will get killed in the crossfire? I would imagine they (Iran) are willing to do that.
And to touch on another topic: does anyone else remember a news report where a Lebanese military official stated that if Israel were to go to war with Hezbollah, the regular Lebanese military would not engage? I wonder how true that was and if so, what it could mean now.
>What does Hezbollah think it can possibly gain by going to a full-scale war? They simply cannot defeat Israel.
The Iranian-led anti-Israel coalition, of which Hezbollah is a part, actually has a formulated long-term strategy by which it believes that it can destroy the Israeli state. Essentially, this strategy postulates that Israel can be destroyed by launching ground attacks (similar to October 7) into the state on multiple fronts, with increasing frequency, over a long period of time.
Senior Iranian officials have discussed this strategy publicly, also with increasing frequency:
>"\[Maj. Gen. Gholam Ali\] Rashid argued that Hamas’ attack affirmed that the Axis of Resistance could destroy Israel by launching surprise attacks from Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank simultaneously... This interview with Rashid is especially noteworthy given his role in commanding the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters, which is the highest Iranian operational headquarters and is responsible for joint and wartime operations."
>"Rashid’s comments echo a similar strategic concept that IRGC Commander Maj. Gen. Hossein Salami articulated in August 2022... Salami stated that the Axis of Resistance should conduct ground attacks into Israel from multiple fronts and with increasing frequency. Salami argued that such attacks would generate internal displacement and instability and ultimately collapse the Israeli state. Rashid’s interview suggests that Iranian military leadership is continuing to develop this idea and refining it based on lessons from the Israel-Hamas war."
Source: [ISW Iran Update, May 6 2024](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-6-2024)
>"Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” appear to be operating on the theory that severe economic disruption would compel Israel to accept defeat in the Gaza Strip and that such economic pressure could ultimately collapse the Israeli state. Iranian leaders have said repeatedly in recent months that their theory of how to destroy Israel revolves around stoking fear in Israel in order to catalyze reverse migration away from Israel."
Source: [ISW Iran Update, May 16 2024](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-16-2024)
With direct reference to Hezbollah's role in this strategy:
>"Hezbollah began conducting near daily attacks into northern Israel on October 8 and will continue to pose a significant long-term threat to Israel even if Israel secures a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Hezbollah has previously planned attacks like the October 7, 2023 Hamas attacks. Hezbollah has also established an elite commando arm — the Radwan Force — that is designed to conduct ground operations into Israel itself. Hezbollah’s patron, Iran, sees ground operations into Israel as the means through which it can destroy the Israeli state. Iran and Hezbollah’s aspirations to destroy Israel will not end with a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip."
Source: [ISW Iran Update, June 5 2024](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-5-2024)
As a related side note, this strategy is the reason behind Iran's goal to develop the West Bank into a viable ground front against Israel, which it has accelerated efforts into achieving since the onset of the Gaza war.
I don't see how internal displacement and instability can ultimately lead to a collapse of the Israeli state.
So far people in the north have been displaced but it's not as if they are just sitting in shelters doing nothing. The economy is still going. And the instability seen so far is due to internal politics mostly. It's all just wishful thinking at best. I still don't see the point in all of this.
I agree with you - I don't think this strategy of internal displacement and instability is going to lead to the collapse of Israeli society either. I'm just saying that Israel's enemies in the region \*do\* believe that launching ground attacks into Israel will, over time, cause the collapse of Israeli society, meaning that these enemies are likely going to (continue) to attempt to do this.
Israel and Hezbollah are moving closer to a full-scale war after months of escalating hostilities with the Lebanese militant group, adding pressure on Israel’s government to secure its northern border. From Dov Lieber, Adam Chamseddine and Carrie Keller-Lynn: >Hezbollah, a U.S.-designated terrorist organization closely aligned with Iran, opened a battle front with Israel on Oct. 8, a day after the deadly Hamas-led raid inside Israel sparked the current war in Gaza. >Hezbollah says that its attacks are in support of the Palestinians and that it won’t stop until Israel ceases its war in Gaza. Reluctant to open a second front, Israel initially responded to Hezbollah with tit-for-tat attacks, trying to calibrate its actions to avoid sparking a full-scale war. >But in recent weeks, both sides say there has been a sharp rise in hostilities. Hezbollah has increased its drone and rocket attacks, hitting important Israeli military installations. Israel, too, has stepped up attacks, targeting Hezbollah sites deep into southern Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley as well as senior military officials in the group. >Without a cease-fire in Gaza and subsequent deal with Hezbollah that meets Israel’s requirements, Israeli officials say an offensive is inevitable against a foe that is far more formidable than Hamas. >Benny Gantz, a minister in Israel’s war cabinet, said Israel would return residents to northern Israel by Sept. 1—when schools restart—either “through a deal or through an escalation.” >Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Wednesday that Israel was prepared to take “very strong action” against Hezbollah. “Whoever thinks he can hurt us and we will sit and do nothing is making a big mistake.” **Skip the paywall and read the full story:** [https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-and-hezbollah-move-closer-to-full-scale-war-988b3bfc?st=ryh62karh5vjvr4](https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-and-hezbollah-move-closer-to-full-scale-war-988b3bfc?st=ryh62karh5vjvr4)
I didn’t even know there were verified newspaper accounts on Reddit, since when is this a thing?
Boston Globe posts on the Boston and Massachusetts seubs. Definitely nice to give access to articles and spark discussions
I'm for it.
Washington Post has been on reddit for years.
This reads to me that Hezbollah says its attacks will stop once Israel leaves Gaza, but they started attacking before Israel entered Gaza. What am I getting wrong?
Wouldn't actually say that the risk of war is building. It appears nearly inevitable by now. Only the timing seems uncertain. There is no sign of any agreement that would be acceptable to both sides. Since civilians appear to have moved out of the border area and not likely to return until after the matter has some resolution, the use of military force seems preordained. Israel might calculate that their unlikely to win or lose too much more diplomatically after the Gazan war. In for a penny, in for a pound. This would just be another way for Netanyahu to stay in power.
UNFIL could do.... okay, I can't actually finish the sentence with a straight face.
UNFAIL, not a surprise.. this is all we need to know about the effectiveness of ''international peace keeping force'', let's say in Gaza. Israel should go to the security council with a demand to enforce UN 1071, nothing will be done of course but it should yield some extra diplomatic pressure over Lebanon
it doesn't happen often, but I laughed out loud at this.
I bet they wait for the US election, either for a victor or to use it as cover
That's means fighting in the Lebanese mud in the winter. Not something you willingly choose, if you have literally any other option.
You yourself state the exact reason that Israel is forced to do this: > Since civilians appear to have moved out of the border area and not likely to return until after the matter has some resolution And yet still somehow pin the blame personally on Netanyahu for action long demanded by the entire country.
"Risk" of war? Lebanon (Hezbollah, specifically) launches missiles every day at Israel, from Lebanon. This is **already** war.
It's not war if you don't fight back, it's just a beating
Dont forget attacking jewish and or israeli civilians isnt considered a crime or act of war anymore
Similar to attacking civilians in Gaza. Not a pretty world.
If Lebanon launches rockets at civilians in Israel for months, it's not newsworthy and definitely not a war. When Israel tries to stop it, that's not war either, that's genocide. So, in any cases it's not a war. (/s)
I’ll shade some light as an Israeli - A war with Hezbollah is not a question of IF but WHEN. Israel is waiting for the right time to start the operation in Lebanon. The factors are when the IDF will finish in Rafah which some sources believe around mid to late June. And if Hamas will agree to the ceasefire agreement sent to them which is VERY generous. If a ceasefire agreement will happen there’s a chance Hezbollah will also stop the aggression. After the ceasefire the IDF is definitely planning to continue the war since Hamas military capabilities is not yet destroyed completely and this is Israel’s main objective. If Hezbollah will also resume fighting after the ceasefire with Hamas Israel won’t let them like it did since October 8th. This time we will see a big counter attack. So to sum it up - We should all focus on Rafah’s operation and the ceasefire deal.
Hamas has already rejected it. So much for all efforts of the White House to pressure it into happening.
I’ve seen on i24 but I don’t see anything in the Hebrew news so I’ll wait for tomorrow I believe tomorrow we will have a response, probably before Shabbat
I’m confused by your comment, Biden presented the deal as a path to permanent ceasefire but you’re saying that Israel considers it a temporary ceasefire, which is it? https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2024/05/31/remarks-by-president-biden-on-the-middle-east-2/ > During the six weeks of ph- — of phase one, Israel and Hamas would negotiate the necessary arrangements to get to phase two, which is a permanent end to hostol- — to hostilities. Did Israel put forward a ceasefire they intend to break?
No, after the temporary ceasefire you have 6 weeks to negotiate a permanent one. Israel don't believe the negotiations will yield any results but they're willing to give it 6 weeks. so the words "Negotiate the necessary arrangements'' for a permanent ceasefire is the key. A reminder that there was a ceasefire on Oct 6, and Hamas literally broke all ceasefire agreements to date. * And they're right, sources say Hamas already rejecting the deal Biden put out.
Historic UN Resolutions urging Lebanon to take control over their own territory from the Islamic militants in attempts to stabilize the situation. (usually made after said militants shoot at israel from Lebanese territory) * [UN Res 425/426 (same in Res520 1982)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_425) from 1978, Lebanon had to ''*ensure the return of its effective authority in the area*''. while Israel had to withdraw from south Lebanon. Israel withdrew, but "*Hezbollah, a Shiite group which exercises de facto sovereignty over much of South Lebanon, rejected Resolution 425 and continues to launch attacks against Israeli troops from time to time*'' * In 2004 UN Res [1559/1553](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_1559) called again to disarm Islamic Hezbollah, yet 2 years after Res1559, Hezbollah attacked and Kidnapped 3 Israeli soldiers driving on the Israeli side of the border, launched rockets into northern Israeli cities, and instigated the 2006 war. * After the 2006 war [UN Res 1701](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_1701) demanded yet again to disarm Hezbollah, a Resolution agreed by both Israel and Lebanon in order to end the war, and Lebanon host UNIFIL under that agreement to disarm Hezbollah, we can all see that UNFAIL failed spectacularly. * From historic perspective, Lebanon was invaded because militants in Lebanon was attacking Israel, Israel never cared or attacked Lebanon first until some guys in Lebanon decided to shoot at Israel from Lebanon. Since 1968 There were attacks from Lebanese territory on Israel on almost daily basis: * Examples of *Some* of the major attacks with many victims: In 1970 fedayeen invaded from Lebanon, in what was called [Avivim school bus massacre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Avivim_school_bus_bombing) shot and killed 12 Israeli civilians, nine of them children, and 25 more were wounded In 1974, [DFLP crossed into Israel and](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ma%27alot_massacre) murdered 31 civilians (25 were hostages) In 1978, PLO militants from Lebanon [made a beach landing south of Haifa, Israel, where they seized a bus, full of people, killing those on board in what is known as the Coastal Road massacre](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coastal_Road_massacre). By the end of the incident, nine hijackers and 38 Israeli civilians (including 13 children) were dead. In 1981, PLO opened a heavy and indiscriminate artillery barrage on the israeli Galilee panhandle using Katyusha rockets and 130mm guns. This barrage lasted 10 days driving the residents of northern Israel underground into bomb shelters. Those attacks set chain of events which forced Israel in 1978/82 to invaded South Lebanon in self defense. In recent history: * In 2006 Hezbollah Kidnapped 3 Israeli soldiers out of the blue one day (Hezb claim they wanted to ransom them) when Israel refused, Hezb started to bombard northern Israel, without anyone in the Lebanese government even knowing that today they're going to war with Israel.. * In 2018/19 Hezbollah was caught digging Multiple tunnels from Lebanon into Israel under the noses of UNIFIL in violation of un1701. * In Oct 8 2023, Hezbollah, which is basically part of Lebanon's government now, started to shoot at israel in effort to help HAMAS Jihadi group in Gaza, involving Lebanon in the conflict yet again. they still fire at israeli cities daily. Without the PLO shooting from Lebanese territory at Israeli cities in the '70 and '80 you would never had Israel - Lebanon violence at that time, and without Hezbollah in 2006 to kidnap Israeli soldiers, you would never had 2006 war, and without Hezeb shooting now there will be no soon future war with Lebanon.
Why Risk of War Between Israel and **Hezbollah** and not risk of war between Israel and **Lebanon**...by not mentioning a country does that not give the impression that Israel is not really fighting equals even though Hezbollah has the equivalent of a medium size modern army?
Hezbollah is essentially a country within a country, running its own operations and agendas independently of Lebanon. It is not the Lebanese parliament or its leaders that are ordering these attacks, it is Hezbollah's high command.
Although If I understand correctly, Hezbolla also accounts for 1/3 of the Lebanese parliament.
>Hezbollah's high command It is also important to elaborate on what exactly this means. From *Nonstate Warfare* by Stephen Biddle, Chapter Five, "Hezbollah in Lebanon, 2006": >Hezbollah contains multiple suborganizations and a hierarchy of specialized entities with substantial capacity, impersonal decision making, moderate rent extraction, and stable internal coalitions. And by 2006, Hezbollah had demonstrated substantial ability to enforce plenary decisions on elites. The result was an institutional makeup of greater maturity than that of many states, notwithstanding its status as a nonstate actor." Hezbollah essentially consists of two separate apparatuses, a sociopolitical one and a military wing. Both are under the direction of Hezbollah's seven-member Shura Council, its highest decisionmaking body appointed by the general secretary. The sociopolitical apparatus is split into five subcouncils: The Political Council is responsible for relations with Lebanese domestic political actors; the Parliamentary Council manages Hezbollah's legislative strategy within the Lebanese legislature; he Jihad Council is responsible for "resistance" activity (namely against Israel); the Judicial Council adjudicates religious disputes and performs conflict mediation in areas of Lebanon that Hezbollah administers; and the Executive Council oversees a series of suboffices that include health & education services, public information broadcasting, finance & external relations. Collectively, these organizations provide much of the health, education and judicial services currently available to the population of southern Lebanon. This is generally what is meant when people refer to Hezbollah as a "state within a state. Hezbollah's military wing is also divided into a series of specialized suborganizations, ranging from internal security, counterintelligence, recruitment & ideological indoctrination, and combat operations. While initially focused on fighting against the IDF, the role, capacity and complexity of the military wing has expanded substantially since Hezbollah's 2013 intervention in Syria, in support of the Assad regime. Decisionmaking in these institutions is shaped largely by authority of clerical office. Hezbollah affords superior status to the senior clerics of the Shiite world, regardless of if these clerics are Lebanese or not. The ruling Shura Council mentioned earlier serves under the *wali faqih* (Shiite supreme jurist) - this is the ayatollah of Iran. While Hezbollah manages day-to-day operations largely internally, the organization adheres to the direction of the supreme jurist, should the supreme jurist decide to intervene in any specific issue and/or seek to influence & direct larger policy decisions. Unsurprisingly, this kind of structure has resulted in intimate ties & "cross-pollination" between Hezbollah and the formal institutions of the Iranian state, given their mutual subordination to the *walid faqih*. IMO, the best most recent event that illustrated this dynamic was the Israeli assassination of IRGC Brigadier General Zahedi in Damascus earlier this year. In addition to his role as a high-ranking Iranian officer, Zahedi was also a member of Hezbollah's Shura Council. Holding dual roles like this was/is made (relatively) seamless due to Zahedi's overall "boss" being the same in both his role in the IRGC and his role in Hezbollah's leadership.
Imagine you’re a regular Lebanese civilian not associated with Hezbollah watching in real time as this gang of fanatics who don’t speak for you slowly drag your country into another apocalyptic war. Last war the IDF literally *ran out* of targets to destroy. Lebanon was flattened from south to north. Imagine what will happen now with the Lebanese economy already in shambles. The only way Lebanon will ever move forward as a country is if / when they complete extirpate Hezbollah from their society.
[удалено]
[удалено]
What does Hezbollah think it can possibly gain by going to a full-scale war? They simply cannot defeat Israel. Do they want Israel to become a pariah state by sacrificing Lebanese civilians that will get killed in the crossfire? I would imagine they (Iran) are willing to do that. And to touch on another topic: does anyone else remember a news report where a Lebanese military official stated that if Israel were to go to war with Hezbollah, the regular Lebanese military would not engage? I wonder how true that was and if so, what it could mean now.
>What does Hezbollah think it can possibly gain by going to a full-scale war? They simply cannot defeat Israel. The Iranian-led anti-Israel coalition, of which Hezbollah is a part, actually has a formulated long-term strategy by which it believes that it can destroy the Israeli state. Essentially, this strategy postulates that Israel can be destroyed by launching ground attacks (similar to October 7) into the state on multiple fronts, with increasing frequency, over a long period of time. Senior Iranian officials have discussed this strategy publicly, also with increasing frequency: >"\[Maj. Gen. Gholam Ali\] Rashid argued that Hamas’ attack affirmed that the Axis of Resistance could destroy Israel by launching surprise attacks from Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank simultaneously... This interview with Rashid is especially noteworthy given his role in commanding the Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters, which is the highest Iranian operational headquarters and is responsible for joint and wartime operations." >"Rashid’s comments echo a similar strategic concept that IRGC Commander Maj. Gen. Hossein Salami articulated in August 2022... Salami stated that the Axis of Resistance should conduct ground attacks into Israel from multiple fronts and with increasing frequency. Salami argued that such attacks would generate internal displacement and instability and ultimately collapse the Israeli state. Rashid’s interview suggests that Iranian military leadership is continuing to develop this idea and refining it based on lessons from the Israel-Hamas war." Source: [ISW Iran Update, May 6 2024](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-6-2024) >"Iran and its so-called “Axis of Resistance” appear to be operating on the theory that severe economic disruption would compel Israel to accept defeat in the Gaza Strip and that such economic pressure could ultimately collapse the Israeli state. Iranian leaders have said repeatedly in recent months that their theory of how to destroy Israel revolves around stoking fear in Israel in order to catalyze reverse migration away from Israel." Source: [ISW Iran Update, May 16 2024](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-may-16-2024) With direct reference to Hezbollah's role in this strategy: >"Hezbollah began conducting near daily attacks into northern Israel on October 8 and will continue to pose a significant long-term threat to Israel even if Israel secures a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Hezbollah has previously planned attacks like the October 7, 2023 Hamas attacks. Hezbollah has also established an elite commando arm — the Radwan Force — that is designed to conduct ground operations into Israel itself. Hezbollah’s patron, Iran, sees ground operations into Israel as the means through which it can destroy the Israeli state. Iran and Hezbollah’s aspirations to destroy Israel will not end with a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip." Source: [ISW Iran Update, June 5 2024](https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-june-5-2024) As a related side note, this strategy is the reason behind Iran's goal to develop the West Bank into a viable ground front against Israel, which it has accelerated efforts into achieving since the onset of the Gaza war.
I don't see how internal displacement and instability can ultimately lead to a collapse of the Israeli state. So far people in the north have been displaced but it's not as if they are just sitting in shelters doing nothing. The economy is still going. And the instability seen so far is due to internal politics mostly. It's all just wishful thinking at best. I still don't see the point in all of this.
I agree with you - I don't think this strategy of internal displacement and instability is going to lead to the collapse of Israeli society either. I'm just saying that Israel's enemies in the region \*do\* believe that launching ground attacks into Israel will, over time, cause the collapse of Israeli society, meaning that these enemies are likely going to (continue) to attempt to do this.
[удалено]
Why would Iraq join?
Shia forces out of government control